The USDA’s Agricultural Research Service recently posted a short piece on its “Scientific Discoveries” site called “Moving Forward with Lettuce Safety.” It is two paragraphs long. I read it three times.

I’ve been litigating E. coli cases since Jack in the Box in 1993. I’ve represented families sickened by contaminated lettuce and spinach for most of the years since. So when the federal government puts “lettuce safety” in a headline, I pay attention.

Here’s my take. The science behind it is fine. The question it answers is narrow. And the way it’s been sold to the public misses the point of why we keep sending kids and grandparents to the hospital after they eat a salad.

What ARS actually did

Between 2017 and 2020 the country had a run of romaine E. coli outbreaks. Some illness clusters showed up far from the fields, in the Midwest and the Northeast. That got the industry wondering about “forward processing” — shipping whole, raw romaine from California and Arizona to plants back East, where it gets chopped, washed, bagged and sold regionally. Longer trip. More time between field and wash line. Could that be helping E. coli along?

ARS scientists led by Xiangwu Nou at the Environmental Microbial and Food Safety Laboratory set out to find out. The project ran from 2022 to 2023 and was funded through the Center for Produce Safety, the produce industry’s research group. The team followed romaine from the same commercial field down two paths — one to a processor near the field, one cross-country to an East Coast plant — with data loggers riding in the bins. Then, in the lab, they inoculated romaine with outbreak strains of E. coli O157:H7 and simulated both trips.

The results: no significant difference in how O157:H7 survived or grew between the two paths. Surviving pathogen numbers were actually a hair lower on the forward-processing side. But — and this matters — the forward-processed lettuce carried a much higher total bacterial load and aged faster in storage.

ARS’s public conclusion: forward processing has been confirmed safe, and the industry doesn’t have to think about an expensive overhaul.

What the page gets wrong, or leaves out

First, a lab finding that E. coli doesn’t grow faster on a long truck ride is not the same thing as “confirming the safety” of anything. E. coli O157:H7 doesn’t need to grow to hurt you. The infectious dose is tiny — as few as 10 to 100 cells. If the bug is on the leaf when it leaves the field, a cold truck to Maryland doesn’t make it safer. It just doesn’t make it much worse. That is a useful answer to a narrow question. It is not a safety certificate.

Second, the page drops the finding that cuts the other way. Lettuce that travels before processing arrived at the plant with a heavier bacterial load and broke down faster. The researchers said that big jump in overall bacteria didn’t show up as more O157:H7 in their simulation. Fair enough. But the public deserves the whole result, not just the part that saves money.

Third, the project title promised more: antimicrobial susceptibility and infectivity. Did the long trip change how E. coli responds to sanitizers in the wash water? Did it change how dangerous the bug is? The public summary says nothing. If those questions were answered, tell us. If they weren’t, say so.

Fourth, look at who the page is written for. Its punchline is that industry was spared an overhaul that would have cost money and disrupted supply. It also claims “tons” of lettuce are discarded every year because of E. coli — with no number and no source. I want that number. It may be the most important fact on the page, because it tells us how often contaminated lettuce gets caught before it reaches us. And by implication, how often it doesn’t.

And finally, the big one. The study never asked how E. coli got on the lettuce in the first place. Truck routes didn’t put cattle manure on romaine. The field did.

What we already know

We are not short on clues. Spring 2018: romaine from the Yuma region sickened 210 people in 36 states, put 96 in the hospital, gave 27 hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS) and killed five. Investigators found the outbreak strain in a 3.5-mile stretch of irrigation canal. FDA noted that canal sat next to a feedlot that can hold more than 100,000 head of cattle. The cattle industry was quick to say no definitive link had been proven. Of course, the environmental sampling happened in June — after the harvest was over and there was no lettuce left to test.

Fall 2018 and fall 2019: a reoccurring strain of O157:H7 caused two multistate romaine outbreaks out of Santa Maria and the Salinas Valley — 234 illnesses in 33 states. Investigators pointed to a contaminated agricultural water reservoir in 2018 and cattle grazing on adjacent land in 2019. In 2019, Maryland — the same state where ARS did this work — found the outbreak strain in an unopened bag of salad.

Fall 2020: FDA found the outbreak strain in cattle feces on a roadside about 1.3 miles upslope from a farm tied to the illnesses. FDA said plainly that outbreak investigations since 2013 point to nearby cattle as a likely contributing factor, and told Central Coast growers to treat this strain as a reasonably foreseeable hazard.

CDC now tracks these as REP strains — reoccurring, emerging or persisting. One, REPEXH01, includes the 2018 Yuma outbreak. Another, REPEXH02, keeps coming back from the California Central Coast fall after fall. It has turned up in sick people, bagged salad, irrigation reservoir sediment, a cattle trough and cattle feces. Recent genomic work found the REPEXH01 strain studied is a close relative of the 2006 spinach outbreak strain. These bugs live out there. They aren’t hitchhiking on trucks.

And it keeps happening. In November 2024 a romaine outbreak sickened 89 people in 15 states, hospitalized 36, caused seven HUS cases and killed one. Fifty of the cases were in Missouri, many tied to salads served at a St. Louis County high school. FDA traced the lettuce to a single grower and ranch, confirmed romaine as the vehicle — and closed the investigation in January 2025 without telling the public who grew it. We identified Taylor Farms through our litigation, not from the government.

Three petitions to close the gaps

After more than thirty years of these cases, the pattern is plain. Investigators find the outbreak strain at the edge of a cattle operation and stop at the fence. They figure out which farm grew the lettuce and don’t tell us. And when the food is pulled, nobody can find out which stores, restaurants or schools got it. I’m filing three citizen petitions with FDA, one for each of those failures.

The first asks FDA to require access and microbial sampling at animal feeding operations implicated in multistate outbreaks. Remember Yuma. Investigators took six samples inside a feedlot built for more than 100,000 cattle — in June, for illnesses that started in March. Six samples is not a negative result. It’s the absence of a test. In a 2025 review of FDA farm investigations after leafy greens E. coli outbreaks from 2009 through 2021, FDA and CDC scientists found livestock nearby in every single-farm investigation where that information was recorded. They also wrote that the two agencies have no direct authority to get onto private livestock land. An operator can simply say no.

The authority is already in the statute. Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act lets FDA write inspection regulations to stop the interstate spread of disease, and it names animals. FDA used it in 1975 to ban the sale of tiny pet turtles that were giving kids Salmonella, and that rule has stood for half a century. My petition asks for something narrow: triggered only by a written finding that an operation is implicated in an outbreak, time-limited, sampling only. No seizing animals. No regulating husbandry. Just let investigators walk onto ground they’ve already identified as the likely source and take samples while the answer can still prevent the next outbreak.

The second asks FDA to stop treating the identity of an outbreak firm as confidential. On September 10, 2026, FDA closed a fourteen-person romaine E. coli investigation and named no grower, no processor, no brand and no state, saying the lettuce was past shelf life. That’s the same reason it gave for keeping quiet about the 89-person outbreak in 2024. Yet FDA has named farms, processors and brands in exactly that situation at least eight times since 2006. In October, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel told HHS that the obstacle is FDA’s own regulations, and that FDA has the authority to change them. My petition asks it to: when epidemiology plus traceback or genomic evidence identifies the source, the name is public — recall or no recall, shelf life or no shelf life.

The third asks FDA to publish retail consignee lists in every Class I food recall — the stores, restaurants, schools, hospitals and nursing homes that got the product — and to classify every recall within ten days. USDA has published those lists for meat and poultry since 2008. If you bought recalled ground beef, you can find out whether your store got it. If you bought recalled bagged salad, you usually can’t. Congress told FDA in 2011 to consider the USDA approach, and FDA wrote guidance instead. Worse, a list that attaches only to the word “recall” can be dodged by never using the word. This fall, chicken wraps tied to a fifty-person E. coli outbreak were “proactively removed” — never called a recall, never classified, no store list. The public learned the brand from a lawsuit we filed, not from the government.

What else we need

Beyond the petitions, here’s the rest of my list.

Study the source, not the truck. Where do REP strains live between outbreaks — cattle, water, soil, dust, wildlife? How do they move from feedlot or rangeland onto a leaf? FDA launched a California longitudinal study years ago. The results need to be public and turned into enforceable setback rules for feedlots and grazing near produce fields. Voluntary guidance has had more than a decade to work. It hasn’t.

Enforce the water rule. FDA’s revised pre-harvest agricultural water rule reached large farms in April 2025 and small farms in April 2026. A rule without inspections, sampling and public data is just paper. Tell us how many farms have been inspected and what was found.

Stop delaying traceability. FDA’s food traceability rule, which covers leafy greens, was supposed to take effect in January 2026. FDA pushed it to July 2028, and Congress then told FDA not to enforce it before that date. Every month of delay means slower tracebacks and more people eating the product after an outbreak has started.

Test the product. Lettuce has no kill step. Nobody cooks a Caesar salad. We need routine, independent microbiological sampling of produce at market — the kind USDA did through its Microbiological Data Program before it was killed in 2012. Bring it back.

Tell the whole story. When ARS posts a public summary, include all the findings, link the peer-reviewed paper, and say who paid for the work. Good science deserves honest communication.

The bottom line

Forward processing didn’t make romaine more dangerous. Good to know. But the lettuce that sickened my clients wasn’t poisoned somewhere on Interstate 80. It was contaminated in a field — often near cattle, often by water — by strains we’ve watched come back for years.

Until research dollars, regulation and transparency are aimed there — starting with these three petitions — “moving forward with lettuce safety” is going to look a lot like standing still.

Sources

USDA ARS, “Moving Forward with Lettuce Safety”

USDA ARS, Research Project: Assessing Romaine Lettuce “Forward Processing”

USDA NAL, Food Safety Research Projects: Forward Processing project record

Food Safety Magazine, Little Difference Between E. coli Growth in Forward vs. Source Processing (May 16, 2024)

Produce Blue Book, forward processing study coverage (May 7, 2024)

Blue Book Services, CPS study gauges pathogen risks from forward processing

Food Poison Journal, CDC final update on 2018 Yuma romaine outbreak

Food Safety News, Yuma romaine growers hopeful harvest will end without E. coli issues (March 2019)

Feedstuffs, FDA mentions cattle farm as potential source of E. coli outbreak (Aug. 8, 2018)

Epidemiology & Infection (PMC), Two multistate STEC O157 outbreaks linked to romaine, 2018–2019

Contagion Live, CDC announces E. coli outbreak likely linked to romaine (Nov. 26, 2019)

Manufacturing.net, FDA details results of 2020 E. coli outbreak in leafy greens

barfblog, FDA findings on the 2020 leafy greens outbreak

CDC (via AFDO), Reoccurring, Emerging, and Persisting (REP) Strains, March 2024

Carter, Carychao & Bono, Frontiers in Microbiology (Dec. 2024), persistence traits in REPEXH01 and REPEXH02 strains

HortiDaily, Lawsuits filed over E. coli outbreak linked to Taylor Farms

Marler Clark, Marler Clark files multiple E. coli lawsuits

Food Safety News, Missouri E. coli outbreak now linked to illnesses in 6 states (Dec. 2024)

Produce Processing, FDA’s E. coli leafy greens investigation leading to new recommendations

FDA, Agricultural water FAQs and implementation of pre-harvest agricultural water requirements

Western Growers, Pre-harvest agricultural water compliance update (2026)

FDA, Food Traceability Rule compliance date

Viazis et al., Farm Investigation Findings for STEC Outbreaks Linked to Leafy Greens, 2009–2021, Journal of Food Protection (2025)

42 U.S.C. § 264 (Public Health Service Act § 361)

Federal Register, Turtles: Intrastate and Interstate Requirements (July 25, 2013)

Marler Blog, FDA now says, Romaine calm (Sept. 10, 2026)

Marler Blog, FDA said the romaine was gone, so it named no grower. Here are eight (Sept. 10, 2026)

9 CFR § 390.10, FSIS availability of retail consignee lists

FDA Guidance, Public Availability of Lists of Retail Consignees to Effectuate Certain Human and Animal Food Recalls

Tuesday changed who will hold the gavels in January. It did not change a single fact about fifty-two babies. Today I sent a third letter to the House Energy and Commerce Committee and a third letter to the Senate HELP Committee — the same two committees I wrote on June 23 and June 29 and again on August 28, and the same seventy-seven offices that each received two t-shirts, by hand, in September. I have had no reply to any of the four letters. The fifth and sixth say the same things, with one addition, and the addition is the point of this post.

What has not changed

Fifty-two infants were hospitalized with botulism after being fed powdered infant formula: forty-eight in the ByHeart outbreak, across seventeen states, and four in the Nara Organics outbreak, in California, Pennsylvania and Washington. Many were on ventilators. Every one of them was treated with BabyBIG, which the State of California prices at $69,300 a dose. On August 27, whole genome sequencing tied a Nara infant to a ByHeart infant, to ByHeart base powder and to four sealed cans of ByHeart formula. Both brands were made with milk supplied by Organic West Milk and spray dried by Dairy Farmers of America. One contamination, two brands, two outbreaks.

Federal regulation still requires powdered infant formula to be tested for two organisms, Cronobacter and Salmonella. Clostridium botulinum is not one of them. H.R. 7867, the bill that would put it there, has sat in Energy and Commerce since its April 29 hearing without a markup. S. 272, which the Senate passed by unanimous consent in April, has been held at the Speaker’s desk since May 4. None of that was on the ballot.

This has never been a party question

The next two months in Washington will be spent assigning blame for Tuesday. I would like infant formula kept out of it, and the record makes that easy.

H.R. 7867 was introduced by Rosa DeLauro, a Democrat, and co-led by Jeff Van Drew, a Republican. S. 272 was introduced by Gary Peters, a Democrat, and John Hoeven, a Republican; the HELP Committee reported it 22 to 0 and not one senator objected on the floor. The March 2023 letter in which the FDA named Clostridium botulinum to the entire powdered formula industry went out under the last administration. Operation Stork Speed, the largest contaminant testing of formula ever run, and last Thursday’s proposed rule modernizing nutrient standards for the first time in nearly thirty years came from this one, and I said so. When Chairman Cassidy demanded answers from ByHeart in December and from Nara in July, I said he was right to. Four years ago, when Sturgis emptied the shelves, the House passed the Access to Baby Formula Act 414 to 9, the Senate cleared it by unanimous consent the next day, and the President signed it that Saturday — four days from introduction to law. Thirty-two years ago, a Democratic administration’s USDA declared E. coli O157:H7 an adulterant in ground beef after Jack in the Box, and every Congress since, of both parties, has left that rule alone.

For my own part: I raised money for a Democratic presidential candidate in 2008, and I have praised a Republican administration’s formula testing in writing to Congress this year. I have sued formula companies without asking how their executives vote. Botulism does not know which party won on Tuesday. Neither did the spore that came in with the milk.

The calendar

Congress returns Monday. Between Monday and the day the 119th Congress adjourns there are, at most, five legislative weeks, with a government funding deadline on December 11 inside them. On January 3, every bill that has not been enacted dies, H.R. 7867 and S. 272 among them. Senator Peters, who wrote S. 272, did not seek re-election, and Chairman Cassidy will not be in the Senate in January either. Whoever holds the gavels will need a sponsor from each party.

I gave both committees three ways to finish before then. Mark up H.R. 7867; the hearing was April 29 and the markup is the only step missing. Or take up S. 272, which sits at the Speaker’s desk and needs no committee: pass it as it stands, or amend it with the testing language of H.R. 7867 and send it back to a Senate that passed the subject without objection. Or put the testing language on anything that must pass before December 11. If none of those happens, reintroduce the bill on the first day of the 120th Congress with a sponsor from each party. I will write the same letter to the same committees on January 4.

One thing in S. 272 deserves more attention than it has had. Its one-business-day notice duty is drafted to follow the list of organisms in 21 C.F.R. § 106.55(e) “or any successor regulation.” The day the FDA adds Clostridium botulinum to its own table, the Senate’s bill reaches botulism without another vote. Which brings me to the petition.

The petition goes to FDA this week

Later this week I will file the citizen petition I posted for comment on October 15. It asks the Commissioner to add botulinum neurotoxin-producing clostridia to the finished-product testing table; to require that each lot of whole milk powder, nonfat dry milk, whey and the other dairy ingredients be tested before it is used, because that is where the organism came in; to require one-business-day notice of a confirmed positive; to finalize the test method within 180 days; and to require supplier verification and lot-level records back to the dryer and the farm. Forty-four parents of twenty-three of these infants are co-petitioners, and Stop Foodborne Illness has joined them. The FDA’s own rules give it 180 days to respond. I will post the docket number when it is assigned, with instructions for commenting.

Everything in the petition is something Congress can order by statute, or press the agency to do at a hearing. The petition is the administrative route. The bill is the legislative one. Either works. Both would be better.

The families will come to Washington

Here is the addition. I will fly the parents of these infants to Washington at my own expense, in the weeks Congress has left this year or in the first weeks of the next one, whichever the committees prefer. They will meet with any member of either committee, in that member’s office, for as long as the member has, and they will bring their children. If a committee holds a hearing, they will testify. If it does not, they will come anyway. Fourteen of them wrote to Congress in June, in their own words, with their children’s photographs. They have been willing to do more than write ever since. All I need is dates.

We have done this before

The Jack in the Box rule took one decision. The 2022 formula bill took four days. The Senate needed one afternoon in April. The bill has been in front of Energy and Commerce for eight months, the sequencing has been public for ten weeks, and the shirts are still on the desks. The families would like to know that a Congress of either party can finish a bill that both parties wrote.

Here are the letters: House Energy and Commerce letter, November 4, 2026 and Senate HELP letter, November 4, 2026.

The June and August letters are here, here, here and here.

Democrats won the House and the Senate on Tuesday. NBC News projected both chambers before the night was over. Republicans held 53 Senate seats going in; Democrats flipped seven, in Iowa, Kansas, Maine, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina and Texas, and by Wednesday held at least 54, with a few races uncalled. In the House, Republicans went in at 218 to 214, and the Associated Press said early Wednesday that Democrats had crossed 218, with dozens of districts still counting. I wrote yesterday about the new Congress. This is about the eight weeks before it is sworn in.

What a lame duck session is

The Congress that lost does not go home. The 119th Congress returns on November 9 and sits until the 120th is seated at noon on January 3, with every member who lost or retired still voting. That is a lame duck session; the Twentieth Amendment, ratified in 1933, is why it lasts eight weeks and not four months.

It is not an empty eight weeks. The stopgap that kept the government open through the election expires December 11. None of the twelve fiscal 2027 spending bills has become law; the House has passed three, the Senate none, and a defense bill and a farm bill wait behind them. Whatever is not signed by January 3 dies. A lame duck is where must-pass bills get written in a hurry and riders nobody read get attached. Section 780, which bars FDA from spending a dollar to enforce its food traceability rule before July 20, 2028, became law on November 12, 2025, in exactly that kind of bill. The window can be used the other way.

Safer food is not a Republican or Democratic issue

Theodore Roosevelt signed the Meat Inspection Act in 1906. The 1994 declaration that E. coli O157:H7 is an adulterant in ground beef came under Bill Clinton, the 2002 law requiring food facilities to register with FDA under George W. Bush, the Food Safety Modernization Act, passed by the Senate 73 to 25, under Barack Obama, and the 2022 law putting an FDA inspector in every infant formula plant once a year under Joe Biden. This year the Making America’s Food Safer Act, introduced by two Republican senators and a Democrat, was reported 22 to 0 and passed the Senate without an objection. Salmonella does not check party registration, and the people who vote on it do not have to either.

What follows comes from Project 2027, the working paper I have circulated since September, and from thirty years of asking for the same handful of things. Each item fits eight weeks and one must-pass bill.

Fifteen things Congress can do before January 3

1. Take Section 780 out of the December package. The House-passed agriculture and FDA bill, H.R. 8646, passed 213 to 210 on June 4 and carries the same bar on enforcing the traceability rule before July 20, 2028. The Senate’s own report language last year said the opposite: full compliance and enforcement by that date. Eleven consumer, public health and labor organizations asked leadership on August 12 to rescind the rider. Whoever writes the December bill decides this.

2. Pass S. 4974 in the House. The Making America’s Food Safer Act passed the Senate by unanimous consent on September 28 and has sat at the House desk since October 5. It lets FDA share unredacted outbreak, inspection and recall information with state and local health departments and order a refused import destroyed instead of re-exported and tried at another port. The House passed the import-destruction half, H.R. 2715, by voice vote in July. One suspension vote finishes it.

3. Pass H.R. 7867, the infant formula bill. Fifty-two infants have been hospitalized with botulism in two outbreaks tied to powdered formula since 2025. Representative DeLauro’s six-page bill, with Republican Jeff Van Drew as lead cosponsor, expands required pathogen testing, requires notice of positive results, and requires FDA to tell Congress within one business day of a serious inspection finding at a formula plant. It is already on the incoming majority’s first-100-hours list; passing it now saves the hundred hours for something else.

4. Put the surveillance back. On July 1, 2025, FoodNet went from eight pathogens to two, and the reason given was money. Fund PulseNet and the state public health laboratories first, because every multistate outbreak count depends on their sequencing, then restore the eight pathogens. Consumer and academic groups asked a year ago for about $36 million more for CDC’s food safety program. This year the request comes with the largest parasitic foodborne outbreak in the country’s history attached.

5. Hold the inspectors harmless. The House bill runs 1.4 percent below the enacted 2026 level. FDA’s foods program should come out of December no worse than it went in, the produce safety cooperative agreements that pay for farm inspections intact, and FSIS’s roughly 8,000 frontline inspectors funded. An adulterant standard nobody can sample for is a press release.

6. Keep preemption out of every must-pass bill. The FRESH Act discussion draft would supersede any state requirement on the use, labeling, sale or marketing of food. Harvard’s Food Law and Policy Clinic read the clause line by line in August and found it reaches allergen disclosure, heavy metal limits, retail inspection and state licensure. The last version of that idea passed the House 283 to 139 in 2006 and died in the Senate. An omnibus or a farm bill is where such a clause hitches a ride.

7. Tell FDA to name the companies. On October 26, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel told HHS in writing that FDA’s own regulations keep the names of firms in outbreaks secret, and that FDA can amend them. Stop Foodborne Illness has had a petition on that question pending since February 4. Report language directing FDA to answer it by a date certain costs nothing. The 2024 romaine outbreak, 89 sick, seven in kidney failure and one dead, closed with the public never told whose lettuce it was.

8. Publish the testing we already pay for. FDA’s Laboratory Flexible Funding Model pays forty state laboratories to sample food and publishes the results only in aggregate. Direct the agency to publish them at the sample level, as USDA’s Microbiological Data Program did until it was defunded in 2012, and to put a dedicated produce sampling program, about $4.5 million a year when last funded, in the fiscal 2028 request.

9. Count imported food. FSMA told FDA to inspect 600 foreign facilities in its first year and double that every year after, 19,200 a year by now, and GAO found it missed those targets every year from 2018 through 2023. The lettuce this summer came from Mexico, the blueberries from Chile, and FDA’s response to the Chilean plant was a records review over the internet. Require FDA to publish each year the foreign facilities inspected, the supplier verification actions taken and the import alerts issued, and stop counting a remote review as an inspection.

10. Hold FSIS to its own Salmonella notice. On May 1, 2024, FSIS determined that not-ready-to-eat breaded stuffed chicken with Salmonella at one colony forming unit per gram or more is adulterated. Testing was to begin May 1, 2025, then November 3, 2025; on December 2, 2025 it was delayed indefinitely. The standard is law and nobody is checking for it. One paragraph in the agriculture bill: publish the method evaluation, say what an acceptable method must show, and set a date.

11. Make an outbreak trigger an inspection. FDA’s investigations table in September carried seventeen open outbreak investigations, most with no on-site inspection, because the statute sets inspection frequency by facility risk category and is silent on the one event that means something went wrong at a particular plant: people got sick. Drafted text exists for a for-cause inspection within a set period once an outbreak is linked to a firm, and for an annual inspection floor for commodities with a recurrent outbreak history. Both fit an appropriations bill; I will send them to any member who asks.

12. Protect the people on the line. FSMA’s whistleblower section, 21 U.S.C. 399d, protects a worker who reports a food safety violation at an FDA-regulated facility; the Labor Department’s own guidance says a meat or poultry plant is not covered unless it also handles FDA-regulated food. The 2022 Abbott formula complaint came from a former employee and sat at FDA for months. Extend the protection to meat and poultry plants. A cheap bill with a natural bipartisan frame.

13. Say who prosecutes food crimes. The Justice Department eliminated the Consumer Protection Branch on September 30, 2025, and moved the work into a unit inside the Fraud Section. The Commerce-Justice-Science bill is one of the twelve. Report language can require the Department to publish its charging guidelines for food cases and say whether the strict-liability misdemeanor under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is still charged. Deterrence nobody can locate is not deterrence.

14. Ask for the national strategy. Federal food safety oversight has been on GAO’s High-Risk List since 2007. In 2017 GAO recommended a national strategy for the fifteen agencies and thirty statutes that share the work; in January 2025 the Office of Management and Budget told GAO there were no plans to write one. A request letter to GAO costs one member’s signature and no gavel.

15. Hold the hearings while the gavels are still in hand. The outgoing chairs hold the gavels through December. The Cyclospora season, 18,445 confirmed cases, closed by FDA at 12,883 illnesses, 570 hospitalizations and two deaths tied to shredded iceberg lettuce from Taylor Farms de Mexico, has never had a hearing. Neither has the Expanded Food Safety Investigation Act, which would let FDA sample the feeding operation next to the lettuce field and has waited four Congresses for one. A December hearing is how a bill comes back in January with a cosponsor from the other party.

The single food safety agency I first asked for in 2002, after the ConAgra recall, is a fight for the 120th Congress. Nothing above waits for it. Fifteen items, eight weeks, one must-pass bill. The members who lost on Tuesday still have a vote until January 3. This is a good use of it. If you want the paper, email me at bmarler@marlerclark.com.

Democrats will control both the House and the Senate when the 120th Congress convenes in January. NBC News projected both chambers before the night was over. By this morning the people who write agendas for a living were already writing them. Here is mine, and I would like it to become ours.

Food safety was not on anyone’s ballot. It never is. Nobody ran on Salmonella. But here is what happened to the food safety system in the two years before this election, and almost none of it required a vote of Congress. On April 25, 2025, FSIS withdrew its Salmonella framework for raw poultry, three years in the making. On July 1, 2025, FoodNet, the network that measures whether anything is working, went from eight pathogens to two. On September 30, 2025, the Justice Department eliminated the branch that prosecuted food cases. On November 12, 2025, the bill that ended the shutdown carried Section 780, which bars FDA from spending a dollar to enforce its own traceability rule before July 20, 2028.

The consequences arrived on schedule. This summer the country ran the largest parasitic foodborne outbreak in its history, 18,445 laboratory-confirmed Cyclospora cases, a year after the parasite was dropped from surveillance. Fifty-two infants have been hospitalized with botulism in two outbreaks tied to powdered infant formula. On September 10, FDA closed a romaine E. coli O157:H7 investigation and named no grower, no processor and no state. Last month, FDA and FSIS called the vehicle in a fifty-person E. coli outbreak “ready-to-eat multi-ingredient chicken wraps,” and the public learned the brand from a lawsuit.

Most of that was done by notice, by budget line or by reorganization. It can be undone the same way.

This has never been a partisan issue

The Food Safety Modernization Act passed the Senate 73 to 25 in 2010. The 1994 declaration that E. coli O157:H7 is an adulterant in ground beef, the 2002 law that required food facilities to register with FDA, and the 2022 law that put an FDA inspector in every infant formula plant once a year all came under presidents of both parties. This July, the Senate HELP Committee reported S. 4974, a food safety bill introduced by two Republican senators, by a vote of 22 to 0. The pathogens do not check party registration, and the people who vote on them do not have to either.

The new majority will govern alongside a president who has promised to use his veto. Almost nothing below needs his signature: hearings do not, appropriations report language does not, and a citizen petition to an agency needs no vote at all.

What Project 2027 is

Since September 5 I have been circulating a working paper called Project 2027 to the food safety, public health, consumer, labor and nutrition community: thirty specific things that would make American food safer and can be done within a year by people who already exist. It has been through two rounds of comments from people who have run FDA’s food center and FSIS, from state regulators and laboratories, and from industry; the current draft is version 10. Nobody is asked to sign it whole; the request is a signature, item by item.

Every item passes three tests: a named person can act on it, it has a vehicle, and somebody is already pushing it. Three come first.

Kill the traceability rider. The current continuing resolution runs out on December 11, so the first decision about Section 780 belongs to the lame-duck Congress, not the new one. The Senate’s own report language says full compliance and enforcement by July 20, 2028. Let it survive conference this time. Eleven consumer, public health and labor organizations asked for exactly this on August 12.

Put the surveillance back. PulseNet and the state public health laboratories first, because every other number in the paper is unmeasurable without them, then the eight FoodNet pathogens. Consumer and academic groups asked Congress a year ago for about $36 million more for CDC’s food safety program. This time the summer goes in with the request.

Name the companies. Stop Foodborne Illness petitioned FDA on February 4 to name every company linked to an outbreak, recall or no recall. It costs the government nothing, and every organization I know can sign a comment supporting it.

Seven petitions that need no vote

Seven citizen petitions were drafted from that agenda and posted for public comment before filing, six to FDA and one to FSIS. Four were filed on October 29, two more went in on Monday, and the seventh goes to FDA on Friday. They ask FDA to test powdered infant formula and its dairy ingredients for the clostridia that cause botulism, with Stop Foodborne Illness and forty-four parents of twenty-three hospitalized infants as co-petitioners; to put a warning on cheese made from unpasteurized milk and finish the 60-day aging review it promised in 2013; to put its twenty-eight-year-old advice about raw sprouts on the package; to say by rule that an implicated firm’s name is not a trade secret; to publish the stores that received a Class I recall when it is announced, as USDA has since 2008; and to take samples at a feeding operation implicated in a multistate outbreak. The seventh asks FSIS to finish what it started in 2024 and determine that Salmonella at 1 CFU/g or more is an adulterant in raw ground chicken, ground turkey and chicken parts. FDA owes an answer to each within 180 days, a deadline no bill in the paper has.

What the new majority has already written down, and what it has not

On September 1, the House Democratic caucus’s Cost-of-Living Healthcare Working Group sent Leader Jeffries an eighty-four-page memorandum on the first 100 hours, first 100 days and first year of the 120th Congress. Food is its seventh category. Three bills in Project 2027 are on it: H.R. 7867, the infant formula bill, and H.R. 8429, heavy metals in baby food, in the first 100 hours, and H.R. 4958, the GRAS Act, in the first 100 days.

Here is what is not on it: the traceability rider, surveillance, naming companies, Salmonella in poultry, imported food, and FDA’s authority to sample the feedlot next to the lettuce field. Every acute-illness item in the paper is missing. I do not read that as a rejection. I read it as the predictable consequence of who was in the room. The working group heard from 145 organizations, and the chemical-safety and chronic-disease side was plainly among them. The pathogen side either was not there, or was there and did not bring a list.

That is the most useful thing we can fix, and it has a date: every bill number dies with the 119th Congress in January. A one-page list of four or five acute-illness items, with bill numbers, cosponsors and supporting organizations in the working group’s own format, is two afternoons of work, and this month is when it matters.

Who has to be in the room

The paper asks for ten hearings and names the witnesses for each: the agency that has to answer, the expert who can be cross-examined, and the person it happened to. I would schedule the bipartisan Safe Food Caucus briefing on produce testing first, because it needs no gavel and it is the least ideological item on the list.

Industry belongs at every one of those tables; a hearing with only our side is a press conference. In 2007 I asked the Salinas growers, at their own lunch, to put me out of business. The beef industry before them took the request seriously. The offer stands.

Then the rest of the room: the consumer groups in the Safe Food Coalition and the other organizations doing the work, the state and local regulators and laboratories who do most of the inspecting and sequencing, the unions whose members stand on the line, the pediatricians, and the diet and chronic-disease groups, who have been treated as a separate world for too long. We share the goal and differ on focus, and on preemption of state food laws we are in the same fight.

What I am asking

Four things. Read the paper; email me at bmarler@marlerclark.com and I will send it. Tell me which items your organization would put its name on. Comment on the petition dockets as they post at regulations.gov. And send me the name of anyone who can get a one-page list in front of the new majority’s working groups before January.

The second draft goes out this month with an item-by-item signature block. A signed version goes to the new Congress in January, when every bill has to be reintroduced anyway. I have said for thirty years that I would like to be put out of business. That has never been closer to a policy proposal than it is this morning, and it is not going to happen one lawsuit at a time.

Josh Swiger, a defense lawyer I know and like, has a new piece in Food Safety Magazine today, November 3, 2026, under the title “The Best Defense Against Foodborne Illness Litigation Begins Before an Outbreak.” Josh has spent 25 years defending food companies in national outbreaks. I have spent more than 30 years suing them. On this we agree: by the time a company is served, most of its defense has already been written, in its food safety plan, in the records that show whether anyone followed it, and in the decisions made before the first person got sick. I have one thing to add, and it is the same thing I have been saying since 2002. The only complete defense to a food poisoning lawsuit is food that does not poison anyone. Put me out of business, please.

Josh has worked the defense side for 25 years, and his advice is sound.

Josh is a partner at Weinberg Wheeler Hudgins Gunn & Dial in Atlanta and a past chair of DRI’s Food Law Special Litigation Group. We have spent our careers on opposite sides of the same kind of case, which is probably why his piece reads to me like a very good description of how I win them.

He explains why these cases are hard to defend. Most states hold sellers of adulterated food strictly liable, so a company can be careful and still lose. Once FDA, USDA or CDC ties a product to an outbreak, a jury is hard to move off that conclusion, and the defense usually needs an alternative explanation for the illness that it cannot produce. Jurors take food poisoning personally, because anyone can get it no matter how careful they are. Verdicts are rising, and settlements with them. His example is the one I spent this summer on, the Cyclosporaoutbreak in iceberg lettuce from Taylor Farms de Mexico, which ended with 12,883 sick in 21 states, 570 hospitalized and two dead when CDC closed it on September 11.

His prescription is the right one. Have a robust written plan. Make sure it describes what the company actually does. Hire or consult a qualified food safety professional. Follow the plan and keep the records that prove it. Carry enough insurance. Preserve evidence. Get counsel who know this area before you need them. Do not assume your product is low-risk, because the list of foods that have never caused an outbreak gets shorter every year. His shortest line is his best: “Say what you do, do what you say.”

The plan is rarely the problem. The gap between the plan and the records is where my cases live.

I have read a lot of food safety plans, most of them in depositions. The plan is almost never the problem. Companies write good plans. The problem is in the records: the sanitation log that was filled in from memory, the environmental swab that came back positive and generated no corrective action, the supplier audit that was scheduled and never done, the water test nobody can find. Josh warns that every deviation from the written plan hands opposing counsel a ready-made argument. He is describing my opening statement.

Strict liability means the only complete defense is a product that never made anyone sick.

The part of Josh’s piece worth stopping on is strict liability. In most states, if the food was adulterated and it caused the injury, the seller pays whether or not it was careless. Care is not a defense. Insurance is not a defense; it is a way to pay. The only complete defense is a product that did not make anyone sick, which means the real question is not how to win the lawsuit but how to never generate one.

That is where I would add a line to Josh’s advice. Say what you do and do what you say, and then test to prove it. Test incoming ingredients. Test the plant. Test finished product where the science supports it. Hold product until the results are back, act on every positive, verify suppliers instead of trusting their paperwork, and keep the records. A file that shows contamination found and product destroyed is the best thing a company can hand its lawyer. A file that shows nobody looked is the best thing a company can hand me.

The beef industry took my advice in 2002, and the hamburger cases stopped.

I know this works because one industry did it. In January 1993, hundreds of people were sickened in the Jack in the Box outbreak and four children died. From that outbreak until the ConAgra recall of 18.6 million pounds of ground beef in the summer of 2002, at least 95 percent of my firm’s revenue came from E. coli O157:H7 cases tied to hamburger. On August 4, 2002, I wrote an op-ed for the Denver Post, “Four Steps to Safer Food,”asking for product sampling, mandatory recall authority, lot records and one food safety agency, and asking USDA and the beef industry to put me out of business.

They largely did. FSIS had declared E. coli O157:H7 an adulterant in raw ground beef after Jack in the Box. After ConAgra, the agency made every ground beef plant reassess its controls, and the industry put real money into carcass interventions and test-and-hold. The hamburger cases went from 95 percent of my practice to nearly zero. I have called that the best thing to happen in food safety in my lifetime. It did not happen because the beef industry found a better defense. It happened because there was nothing left to defend.

I said the same thing to the Salinas lettuce and spinach growers in person in February 2007, five months after the Dole spinach outbreak killed five people whose families I represented. Last month, after the largest Cyclospora outbreak in American history, I asked the lettuce industry again. The offer is still open.

Josh’s checklist is my first request for production.

Here is what I want Josh’s clients to take from his piece. Everything on his list, the written plan, the records that show employees followed it, the qualified food safety professional, the supplier verification, the preserved evidence, is also the first thing I ask for in discovery. When those documents exist and say what they should, a case is harder for me to bring and quicker to settle on fair terms. When they do not exist, the case writes itself. A company that does what Josh describes, and tests to prove it, will rarely need Josh at all. I suspect he would be fine with that.

One more thing that is not in his article or in any food safety plan. Go meet someone who got sick from a product like yours. I have been asking executives and regulators to do that for thirty years. It changes how you read your own records.

Josh, nice piece. Send it to every client you have. Then tell them that the cheapest and surest way to never see either of us is to make food that does not make people sick. Put us both out of business, please.

Here we go again

I have been doing this since the Jack in the Box E. coli outbreak in 1993. In the thirty-plus years since, I have heard one defense argument more than any other: “Nobody ever found the bacteria in our food.”It sounds like a good argument. It isn’t. It misunderstands how CDC, FDA and state health departments actually solve outbreaks, and it ignores the most powerful tool public health has ever had for linking sick people together: whole genome sequencing, or WGS.

Here is the short version. WGS tells us which sick people are part of the same outbreak. Epidemiology tells us what they ate. Traceback tells us where that food came from. When those line up, the government names the food, positive food sample or not. And when the traceback from ill people converges on a single farm, plant or supplier, the case gets even stronger.

WGS is DNA evidence for bacteria

Think of WGS as forensic DNA testing for germs. A public health lab takes the Salmonella, E. coli or Listeria cultured from a sick person’s stool or blood and reads essentially its entire genetic code. Isolates that are nearly identical share a recent common source. Period.

CDC’s PulseNet network uses WGS to build those DNA fingerprints and then looks for clusters of matching patterns that signal an outbreak. PulseNet retired the older PFGE method and made WGS its primary surveillance tool, in part because PFGE could lump unrelated strains together. FDA runs a companion network, GenomeTrakr, that sequences bacteria from food, farms and plants and posts them to a public database. A multiagency federal report describes the two systems as complementary tools for linking related pathogens during outbreaks.

Here is what matters in a courtroom: the government’s outbreak case definition is a WGS definition. In the 2022 Wendy’s E. coli outbreak, a case was a person whose isolate was closely related to the outbreak strain by cgMLST, with illness onset in a set window. If your bug matches, CDC has already decided you are part of the outbreak.

And WGS is honest. In the 2015 Blue Bell Listeria outbreak, it added three Texas patients and kicked out a fourth whose isolate did not match. A test that can say “no” is a test whose “yes” means something.

The food is usually gone

A negative food test usually means the contaminated lot is long gone, not that it was ever clean.

  • Time. It typically takes 3 to 4 weeks to determine whether a sick person is part of an outbreak. Lettuce, onions and restaurant ingredients turn over in days.
  • Shelf life. In the 2023 pico de gallo Salmonella outbreak, by the time FDA had enough to name the product, it was past its shelf life. Same with the sprouts in a 2025 E. coli O26 outbreak.
  • Sampling. Contamination is spotty and low-level. A few samples from a later lot or a freshly sanitized plant can easily miss it.
  • Foot-dragging. In the 2018 Yuma romaine outbreak, romaine was implicated in mid-April, but canal water was not sampled until June 4–8. When it finally was, it matched.

CDC admits it doesn’t solve every outbreak because some end before enough information is gathered. Food testing is one of three kinds of evidence it uses, not the price of admission.

How the government actually solves outbreaks

CDC uses three types of data to find an outbreak food: epidemiologic, traceback, and food and environmental testing. It does not need all three, and it names sources on epidemiology and traceback alone all the time. It works like this:

  1. WGS links the people. Genetically matching isolates tell investigators the patients share a source, even if they live in different states and never met.
  2. Epidemiology points to the food. Interviews show what those patients ate, and whether one food shows up far more often than it would by chance.
  3. Traceback points to the source. Investigators follow individual patients’ purchases back up the supply chain, looking for a common point in the distribution chain where the food could have been contaminated.

Now think about what convergence means. Patients in different states, who bought food at different stores and restaurants, all trace back to one grower or one processor. That is not coincidence. That is the answer.

The CIFOR guidelines describe investigations the same way: epidemiology, traceback and environmental assessment, and lab data, integrated. And CDC says it acts when there is clear and convincing information linking illness to a food. That is a higher bar than the more-likely-than-not standard my clients have to meet in a civil case.

The examples, and there are plenty

Every outbreak below was solved by WGS, epidemiology and usually traceback. In none of them did anyone find the outbreak strain in a food sample.

OutbreakPathogenIllnessesWhat tied illnesses to the foodFood and site testing
McDonald’s slivered onions (Taylor Farms), 2024E. coli O157:H7104 in 14 states; 34 hospitalized, 1 death (CIDRAP)80 of 81 interviewed ate at McDonald’s; 63 ate an item with slivered onions; traceback to Taylor FarmsOutbreak strain never found; one onion and one grower sample had a different, non-matching STEC
Grimmway Farms organic carrots, 2024E. coli O12148 in 19 states; 20 hospitalized, 1 death (FDA)26 of 27 interviewed ate carrots; traceback found Grimmway as the common supplierTwo environmental STEC positives did not match (summary)
Pico de gallo, 2023Salmonella Paratyphi B37Epidemiology and tracebackAll samples negative; product past shelf life
Indiana cantaloupe, 2022Salmonella Typhimurium88 in 11 states; 32 hospitalizedEpidemiology and traceback to southwest Indiana melonsSalmonella found on farms and in the packinghouse; none matched
California peaches, 2020Salmonella Enteritidis101 in 17 states; 28 hospitalizedEpidemiology and traceback to one large growerNo sample matched
Sprouts, 2025E. coli O26:H1110Interviews and tracebackNone available; past shelf life
Evergreen Fresh sprouts (Idaho), 2011Salmonella Enteritidis25 in 5 states69% of early cases ate sprouts vs. a 4.4% background rate; traceback to one growerEverything tested negative

McDonald’s is the textbook case. FDA said flatly that the outbreak strain was not found in onion or environmental samples, yet epidemiology and traceback showed the recalled onions were the likely source. Taylor Farms recalled. McDonald’s switched suppliers. New cases stopped once the Quarter Pounder came off the menu. Grimmway played out the same way a month later.

Even when the ingredient stays uncertain, WGS still ties the victims to the place. In the 2022 Wendy’s outbreak, WGS identified 109 sick people in six states. More than 80% of those interviewed ate at Wendy’s, and 46 of 68 with detailed histories ate romaine on sandwiches. Traceback never converged on one grower, so CDC did not confirm the romaine. Nobody seriously argued the illnesses came from somewhere other than Wendy’s. And the outbreak strain was closely related to a 2021 spinach outbreak strain, pointing right back at leafy greens.

When the match finally shows up, it lands right where WGS said it would

Sometimes investigators do eventually find the outbreak strain in a field, a canal or a plant. When they do, it confirms what WGS and traceback already told us, sometimes years earlier.

The match was never what made the case. It just proved the science right, again.

What this means for people who got sick

If your isolate is a WGS match to an outbreak strain, and epidemiology and traceback point to a food, you have the same proof the government uses to order recalls. Demanding a positive leftover on top of that asks more of a sick child’s family than CDC and FDA ask of themselves.

Courts get this. In Patterson v. Kevon, LLC (Ga. 2018), the Georgia Supreme Court rejected the idea that food poisoning plaintiffs carry a heavier summary judgment burden than anyone else. In Goldman v. Chop’t Creative Salad Co. (N.Y. App. Div. 2024), negative supplier tests and no other sick diners were circumstantial and not dispositive, and the case moved forward.

Those cases did not even involve an outbreak. WGS adds what older cases lacked: objective, molecular proof that my client’s bacteria came from the same source as dozens of others. When those others all trace back to one supplier, the defense is left arguing that genetically identical infections across multiple states share some cause other than the one food everyone ate.

If you get sick in an outbreak:

  • Get a stool test. No isolate, nothing to sequence.
  • Talk to the health department. Your food history and receipts drive the epidemiology and traceback.
  • Keep everything. Leftovers, packaging, receipts, loyalty card records. A positive sample isn’t required, but it never hurts.

The genome doesn’t lie. Neither does a traceback.

Sources

In 2026 Nara Organics sold its formula as a “European-made” product, manufactured in Germany. But the milk inside those cans started on California dairy farms. It was the same organic milk, from the same supplier, dried by the same cooperative, that FDA tied to the ByHeart infant botulism outbreak in November 2025.

That is the story of the second infant formula botulism outbreak in seven months. It is a supply chain that crossed an ocean twice and passed through six companies before it reached a baby’s bottle. Below, I walk through each link in that chain, what FDA has found so far, and what is still unanswered.
 
The outbreak
 
Four infants in California, Pennsylvania and Washington were hospitalized with type A infant botulism after drinking Nara Organics Whole Milk Organic Powdered Infant Formula. All four fell ill in April and May 2026, all four were boys under five months old, and all four were treated with BabyBIG.
 
FDA and CDC contacted Nara late on Friday, June 12. Nara recalled every lot the next day, calling it a step taken “out of an abundance of caution.” On July 6, FDA reported that an opened can of Nara formula from one sick baby’s home tested positive for Clostridium botulinum.
 
On August 27, FDA declared the outbreak over and released its key supply chain finding. The Nara lots linked to the illnesses were made with milk from Organic West Milk Inc. and spray dried by Dairy Farmers of America — the same two suppliers behind the ByHeart botulism outbreak. Whole genome sequencing also matched an infant who drank Nara formula to the ByHeart outbreak. FDA concluded that the two outbreaks share a common source of contamination.
 
The ByHeart outbreak
 
Nara was the second infant botulism outbreak. The first, linked to ByHeart Whole Nutrition infant formula, was far larger. When CDC declared it over on February 26, 2026, it counted 48 infants with infant botulism — 28 confirmed and 20 probable — in 17 states. All 48 were hospitalized. No deaths were reported.
 
California’s Infant Botulism Treatment and Prevention Program spotted the problem in early November 2025, after an unusual rise in cases among babies fed ByHeart. ByHeart first recalled two lots, then every ByHeart product days later. Because illnesses traced back as far as December 2023, CDC widened its case definition to cover any infant with botulism exposed to ByHeart since the formula launched in March 2022.
 
Testing found C. botulinum in opened and sealed ByHeart cans, in ByHeart’s base powder, and in organic whole milk powder. FDA identified 17 different strains of the bacteria across patients, product and ingredients. The milk powder came from Organic West Milk and was dried at Dairy Farmers of America’s plant in Fallon, Nevada, where FDA itself collected two matching isolates.
 
The link between Nara and ByHeart
 

FDA has tied the two outbreaks together in three ways.

  1. Same milk. The Nara lots linked to illness were made with organic whole milk from Organic West, ByHeart’s milk supplier.
  2. Same dryer. That milk was spray dried by Dairy Farmers of America, the same processor that dried ByHeart’s milk powder.
  3. Same bacteria. Whole genome sequencing matched a Nara baby’s C. botulinum to bacteria from a ByHeart baby, from ByHeart’s base powder and from sealed ByHeart cans.

From that evidence, FDA concluded that the two outbreaks share a common source of contamination. Put plainly, it appears to be one contamination problem in one supply of organic whole milk powder, sold under two brands. ByHeart’s babies got sick first; Nara’s babies got sick after ByHeart’s recall, because no one had connected Organic West’s milk and Dairy Farmers of America to Nara’s formula.

The common thread is whole milk. Many U.S. infant formulas are built on skim milk with added plant oils. ByHeart and Nara both broke from that model, and both sold parents on whole milk as the reason to pay a premium. That selling point is exactly where the two outbreaks meet: organic whole milk powder was the ingredient they shared, and it is where FDA found C. botulinum. Brands built on that ingredient had every reason to test it for spores.

ByHeart sent its customers to Nara

The connection is not only on paper. When ByHeart recalled all of its formula in November 2025, it pointed its customers to Nara. A November 11, 2025 ByHeart Instagram post recommended Nara products and offered a 20 percent discount code to help families make the switch. ByHeart deleted the post in June 2026, after Healthbeat asked about it, saying it removed the post for safety reasons following the Nara news.

ByHeart says the two companies have no corporate, financial, contractual or manufacturing relationship. But parents who followed ByHeart’s advice moved their babies from one whole milk formula to another that, FDA later found, was made with milk from the same suppliers. The ByHeart recall took one brand off the shelves. It did not take that milk out of the formula supply.

From California dairy to Nara can

Piecing together FDA’s findings, U.S. Customs records and reporting by Food Safety News, eFoodAlert and the Associated Press, the milk traveled this route:

Nara Organics formula supply chain · farm to infant

The milk crossed the Atlantic as powder, became formula in Germany, was canned in Denmark, and came back to the United States under the Nara label. One link — how the powder got from DFA to Elb-Milch, and who sold it — has not been made public.

The branch to ByHeart matters. In January 2026, the AP reported that the organic whole milk powder that tested positive in the ByHeart outbreak came from Organic West milk dried at DFA’s plant in Fallon, Nevada. FDA’s Nara findings name the same two companies. C. botulinum spores survive pasteurization, so contamination that enters at the milk or drying stage can ride all the way into the finished can.

The incomplete customer list

The most troubling fact in FDA’s report is this. During the ByHeart investigation in late 2025, FDA ran a traceforward to learn whether Organic West sold milk to any other powdered infant formula maker. According to FDA, Organic West gave the agency an incomplete customer list — one that did not show its milk was going to the manufacturer of Nara’s formula.

In January 2026, an owner of Organic West told the Associated Press that the company had not sold organic whole milk powder to any infant formula maker other than ByHeart.

Meanwhile, Nara kept importing formula made with that milk. U.S. Customs records show shipments from Elb-Milch through April 30, 2026. The four Nara babies got sick in April and May. Had FDA known in late 2025 that Organic West’s milk was also going into Nara cans, those babies might never have been exposed.

Nara should have asked

Organic West’s list was not the only safeguard that failed. Nara had its own reasons to ask hard questions, and months to ask them.

ByHeart was Nara’s closest competitor: a premium organic whole milk formula sold to the same parents. When ByHeart recalled every can in November 2025, and FDA traced the problem to contaminated organic whole milk powder, every whole milk formula brand in the country should have asked one question: where does our milk powder come from?

Nara knew spore-forming bacteria were a risk. It told customers it had screened for clostridia from its very first batch. A company that understood that hazard, and watched its nearest competitor’s outbreak trace back to milk powder, should have checked whether its own formula used the same milk or the same dryer.

If Nara asked, it either learned it shared ByHeart’s supply chain and kept selling, or it got an answer it did not verify. If it never asked, that is its own failure. Either way, Nara kept importing formula made with that milk until April 2026 — five months after the ByHeart recall — and four more babies got sick.

What we still don’t know

  • Where the spores got in. FDA says there is not yet enough evidence to tell whether the milk was contaminated before drying or during it.
  • Which DFA plant dried Nara’s milk. ByHeart’s powder was dried at DFA’s Fallon, Nevada plant. FDA’s Nara findings name DFA but not the plant.
  • Who sold the powder to Germany. Organic West resold the dried powder to ByHeart. Whether it, DFA or a broker sold the powder to Elb-Milch has not been made public.
  • Who chose U.S. milk. Nara marketed EU standards. Whether Nara or Elb-Milch decided to use U.S. organic whole milk powder is unknown.
  • What anyone tested. Did Elb-Milch or Nara test incoming powder for C. botulinum spores after the ByHeart recall became public?

Why it matters

Parents who paid a premium for Nara bought a promise of European safety standards. What they got was formula built on the same California milk powder that had already sickened babies through ByHeart. A “Made in Germany” label told them where the formula was mixed, not where its main ingredient came from.

This outbreak also shows how little the system knows about who supplies whom. FDA asked the right question in 2025 and, by its own account, got an incomplete answer. Infant formula supply chains should not depend on a supplier’s voluntary customer list. Ingredient sourcing should be traceable, and whole milk powder destined for infant formula should be tested for C. botulinum spores.

That is why I am filing a citizen petition with FDA, joined by 46 parents of 24 infants sickened in the ByHeart and Nara outbreaks. It asks FDA to add C. botulinum and the other botulinum toxin-producing clostridia to the required tests for powdered infant formula, to require that every lot of whole milk powder and other dairy ingredients test negative before it is used, and to require formula makers to keep records tracing each ingredient lot back to its dryer and its dairy farms. Had those records been required, the shared supply chain would have been sitting in Nara’s files when ByHeart sent its families there.

References

WHAT IS INFANT BOTULISM AND CLOSTRIDIUM BOTULINUM?

Clostridium botulinum is an obligate anaerobic, spore-forming, Gram-positive bacillus whose primary, native habitat is the soil.[1] It thrives in low-oxygen environments and produces botulinum neurotoxin, one of the most lethal biological substances known. The spores themselves are widespread in the environment and harmless to most older children and adults, but the toxin the bacteria produce attacks the nervous system and causes botulism, a severe paralytic illness.

Types of Botulism:

  • Foodborne: Caused by eating foods contaminated with the toxin, often from improper home-canning or poorly preserved foods.
  • Infant: Occurs when babies (under one year old) ingest the bacterial spores, which then germinate and produce toxins in the gut. This is why honey should never be given to a child under one year old. Contaminated powdered infant formula has now been identified as a second avoidable vehicle.
  • Wound: Happens when C. botulinum spores infect a cut or wound and produce toxins, commonly associated with the use of contaminated injection drugs.
  • Iatrogenic Botulism: A rare type that occurs if too much botulinum toxin is injected for cosmetic purposes (like wrinkle reduction) or medical conditions (like migraines).
  • Adult Intestinal Toxemia: An extremely rare condition in older children and adults where spores colonize the intestinal tract and produce toxin (like infant botulism).

A.  Where Does Clostridium Botulinum Come From?

1.  Soil and Sediment: The Ultimate Natural Reservoir

Landmark environmental surveys dating back over a century have established that viable C. botulinum spores reside in ground soils, dust, and aquatic sediments across every continent where they have been sought. The distribution of specific toxin types in infant botulism cases typically reflects the geographic prevalence of those strains in the local soil. For example, in the United States, Type A spores are predominantly found in the western states, while Type B spores are more densely concentrated in the eastern and mid-Atlantic states. Because spores are highly resistant to environmental stressors (such as drying, heat, and UV light), they easily become airborne. Dust inhalation or ingestion is now considered a primary and largely unavoidable exposure route.[2] Epidemiological studies have associated infant botulism cases with residence in windy or dusty locations, as well as proximity to dust-generating activities.

2.  Honey: The Longest-Recognized Identifiable and Avoidable Food Source

While environmental exposure is largely unpreventable, honey has long been recognized as the most significant avoidable foodborne vehicle for C. botulinum spores.[3] C. botulinum is not a disease of the honeybee. Instead, honey becomes an accidental repository when bees carry environmental dust, water, or pollen contaminated with spores back to the hive.[4] Because honey is typically consumed raw (unpasteurized and non-irradiated), and because bacterial spores are uniquely structurally adapted to survive low-moisture environments, the dormant spores remain viable inside the honey matrix indefinitely. Globally, about 4% of retail honey specimens test positive for Clostridium botulinum spores, though regional rates vary widely. While some localized surveys find no spores, others report contamination rates as high as 10% to 20% depending on the source and processing methods.[5]

3.  Powdered Infant Formula: A Newly Documented Vehicle

Until recently, honey was the only food widely recognized as a source of C. botulinum spores in infants. That changed in 2025. Beginning in November of that year, FDA and CDC investigated a multistate outbreak of infant botulism among infants fed ByHeart Whole Nutrition powdered infant formula; the outbreak closed with 28 confirmed and 20 probable cases, and C. botulinum was detected in an open can of the formula, in unopened cans from a lot fed to a patient, and in the base mix used to make the product. In June 2026, a second outbreak was linked to Nara Organics powdered infant formula, with four confirmed cases in California, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Both brands’ formulas were made with milk from the same supplier, spray dried by the same processor. Powdered infant formula is not a sterile product, and the heat used in its manufacture does not reliably destroy bacterial spores. Because detection of C. botulinumin powder is scientifically difficult, FDA has cautioned that a negative test does not rule out the presence of the organism in a product.[6]

B.  Infant Botulism and Clostridium botulinum

Infant botulism is a rare but serious paralytic illness of babies, usually affecting infants younger than one year. It is caused when an infant swallows spores of Clostridium botulinum, or rarely related toxin-producing Clostridium species, and those spores survive, germinate, and multiply in the immature intestine. The bacteria then produce botulinum neurotoxin inside the infant’s gut. In plain terms, the baby does not simply ingest a “germ”; the infant’s bowel becomes the place where the toxin is made.[7] [8]

That mechanism is what separates infant botulism from classic foodborne botulism. In foodborne botulism, a child or adult typically swallows toxin that has already formed in contaminated food. In infant botulism, the infant swallows spores, and the toxin is produced after the spores colonize the intestine. Infants are uniquely vulnerable because their gut microbiome, bile-acid profile, immune defenses, and intestinal motility are still developing, and they do not yet have the mature protective intestinal flora that usually prevent C. botulinum spores from gaining a foothold in older children and adults.[9] [10] Infant botulism is the most commonly reported form of botulism in the United States, accounting for roughly 70% of all reported botulism cases, or about 100 to 150 cases in a typical year. Approximately 90% to 95% of cases occur in infants under six months of age, with a median age at onset of about four months. Most cases are caused by toxin type A or type B.[11] Because such spores are so widespread in the environment, in many individual cases the exact source is never identified.[12]

C.  Signs and Symptoms in Infants

Infant botulism often begins subtly and then progresses over hours to days. Constipation is commonly one of the earliest signs, followed by poor feeding, weak suck, weak or altered cry, drooping eyelids, diminished facial expression, reduced gag reflex, poor head control, generalized hypotonia, lethargy, and respiratory difficulty. CDC’s clinical overview specifically lists constipation, poor feeding, ptosis, sluggish pupils, flattened facial expression, diminished suck and gag reflexes, weak or altered cry, and respiratory difficulty or arrest as typical findings.[13] Common signs include:

  • Constipation, often for several days;
  • Poor feeding, with weak sucking and swallowing;
  • A weak, altered, or soft cry;
  • Drooping eyelids (ptosis), sluggish pupils, and reduced eye movement;
  • Generalized weakness and low muscle tone—the classic “floppy baby”;
  • Lethargy and a diminished gag reflex; and
  • Breathing difficulty, progressing in severe cases to respiratory failure—the most dangerous complication.

Because these early signs mimic more common conditions, a high index of suspicion matters. A baby with poor feeding, a weak cry, and increasing floppiness—especially with any breathing difficulty—needs urgent evaluation.[14]

D.  Botulism in Older Children and Adults

The same toxin can cause serious illness in older children and adults, but the exposure pattern is different. Foodborne botulism occurs when a person eats food in which toxin has already formed, classically improperly canned, preserved, fermented, or stored low-acid foods. Wound botulism occurs when spores contaminate a wound and produce toxin in devitalized tissue; in modern U.S. practice, this is often associated with injection-drug use. Iatrogenic botulism can occur after excessive or improperly administered therapeutic or cosmetic botulinum toxin. Adult intestinal colonization botulism is rare but can occur when the adult gut is altered by surgery, antibiotics, bowel disease, or other disruptions.[15] [16]

In non-infant botulism, symptoms often begin with cranial nerve findings such as blurred or double vision, drooping eyelids, slurred speech, difficulty swallowing, dry mouth, and facial weakness. Weakness then typically descends symmetrically from the face and neck to the arms, trunk, and legs. Patients are usually awake and afebrile, and sensation is usually preserved, which can make the paralysis especially frightening. Severe cases require intubation and mechanical ventilation. Id.

E.  Diagnosis and Laboratory Detection

Botulism is first and foremost a clinical diagnosis. Laboratory confirmation is important, but treatment should not wait for test results when the clinical picture is concerning. CDC’s 2021 clinical guidelines emphasize that timely diagnosis is crucial because antitoxin is the only specific therapy and should be administered as quickly as possible. Because the antitoxin works best when given early, clinicians treat as soon as infant botulism is reasonably suspected.[17]

For infants, definitive testing usually requires stool or enema specimens, which can be tested for botulinum toxin and cultured for C. botulinum. Testing is specialized and is generally coordinated through state public health laboratories, CDC, and the California Department of Public Health Infant Botulism Treatment and Prevention Program. CDC advises that this specialized testing often takes days and that clinicians should not delay BabyBIG treatment while awaiting confirmation.[18]

In outbreak investigations, public health laboratories may also test leftover foods, unopened products, ingredients, environmental samples, and bacterial isolates from patients. Whole-genome sequencing can compare isolates from patients, products, and ingredients to determine whether they are genetically related. In the 2025 ByHeart outbreak, that genetic comparison was central because isolates from clinical samples, finished formula, and the base mix used to make it clustered together. In the 2026 Nara Organics outbreak, sequencing tied a clinical isolate from an infant fed one brand of formula to a clinical isolate, a base powder sample, and four samples of unopened cans of a different brand. FDA concluded that the matching sequences, together with the supply-chain commonalities, indicated a common source of contamination between the two outbreaks, while stating that it still could not say whether the milk was contaminated before or during spray drying. There is yet no standardized method for detecting C. botulinum or its spores in powdered formula, and only a limited number of laboratories perform the testing. The FDA’s outbreak workflow enriches a 200-gram sample for up to five days, screens the enrichment by quantitative PCR, and confirms positives by mass spectrometry for active toxin and by whole genome sequencing; the FDA describes that workflow as interim, pending method validation and approval.[19] [20]

F.  Treatment

Infant botulism is highly treatable, and the great majority of babies recover fully. Care rests on two pillars: specific antitoxin and supportive care.[21] Treatment has two parts: neutralizing circulating toxin and supporting the patient while nerves recover. For infants, the specific treatment is human botulism immune globulin intravenous, known as BIG-IV or BabyBIG. BabyBIG is FDA-approved for infant botulism types A and B and is obtained in the United States through the Infant Botulism Treatment and Prevention Program. The treating physician contacts the program for immediate consultation; if the presentation supports infant botulism, BabyBIG is released and treatment begins without waiting for final laboratory confirmation.[22] [23]

The evidence for BabyBIG is strong. In a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled California trial of 122 infants with laboratory-confirmed infant botulism, reported in the New England Journal of Medicine in 2006, treatment within three days of hospital admission reduced mean hospital stay from 5.7 weeks to 2.6 weeks. It also reduced ICU time, mechanical ventilation time, tube or intravenous feeding time, and hospital charges. In plain language, BabyBIG does not instantly make the baby well, but it stops additional circulating toxin from binding and can substantially shorten the illness.[24]

Supportive care is equally important. Infants may need close ICU monitoring, respiratory support, mechanical ventilation, suctioning, prevention of aspiration, nutritional support through nasogastric or other tube feeding, bowel care, occupational therapy, feeding therapy, physical therapy, and careful discharge planning. Antibiotics are generally not used to treat infant botulism itself because bacterial killing in the gut may increase toxin release; aminoglycosides and certain other medications that impair neuromuscular transmission are avoided because they can worsen weakness.[25]

For older children and adults with suspected foodborne, wound, or other non-infant botulism, the specific antitoxin is generally heptavalent botulinum antitoxin, obtained through public health authorities and CDC. As with infants, antitoxin should be given as early as possible, because it neutralizes toxin that has not yet bound to nerves. Wound botulism also requires wound evaluation and debridement, and antibiotics may be used for wound infection after antitoxin decisions are addressed.[26] [27]

G.  Prognosis, Recovery, and Complications

With prompt recognition, BabyBIG, and modern intensive care, most infants survive and recover. That favorable long-term prognosis, however, should not obscure the severity of the acute illness, which is frightening, often protracted, and frequently requires weeks of intensive hospital care. The recognized complications include:

  • Respiratory failure, apnea, and aspiration—the principal reason a ventilator may be required (on average roughly three weeks when needed);
  • Prolonged feeding difficulty—safe oral feeding can take many weeks to return;
  • Autonomic effects such as urinary retention, and secondary infections (e.g., pneumonia, ear infection) acquired in the hospital;
  • Prolonged general weakness during recovery.[28] [29] [30]

A baby with infant botulism may spend days to weeks unable to feed safely, protect the airway, or breathe without support. Families may experience a prolonged hospitalization, transfer to a tertiary children’s hospital, repeated testing, feeding-tube dependence, ventilator care, and months of follow-up.[31] In the 2025 ByHeart-formula outbreak, CDC EIS preliminary data found that approximately two-thirds of evaluated infants required post-hospitalization physical therapy or feeding support.[32] Reasonable follow-up commonly includes primary care, neurology as needed, feeding or speech therapy, physical and occupational therapy, nutrition monitoring, developmental surveillance, and assessment for residual weakness, dysphagia, oral aversion, motor delay, or caregiver trauma. Id. Lasting neurological after-effects are seldom seen, and most infants regain normal strength and development; severe long-term harm is rare. Follow-up with neurology and physiotherapy is advisable after a severe episode.[33]

THE 2026 NARA ORGANICS INFANT FORMULA BOTULISM OUTBREAK

A.  Extraordinary Circumstances

Infant botulism is normally sporadic; bacterial spores are widely present in soil and dust around the country and therefore may cause sporadic, random infections. A multistate outbreak of infant botulism tied to a manufactured product is therefore unusual,[34] and until 2025, it had never happened. According to the FDA, the 2025 ByHeart outbreak was the first botulism outbreak tied to infant formula in the United States since the infection was first described about fifty years ago.[35] The Nara Organics outbreak of 2026 is the second, and it followed the first by seven months. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) concluded that epidemiologic, traceback and laboratory evidence showed that Nara Organics Whole Milk Organic Infant Formula was contaminated with C. botulinum and made infants sick, and that the data indicate a common source of contamination in the Nara Organics outbreak and the 2025 ByHeart outbreak.[36]

B.  What Makes Formula Vulnerable

Powdered infant formula is not sterile, and the pathogens usually tested for (such as Cronobacter and Salmonella) do not form spores and are killed by pasteurization. Spore-forming bacteria, like C. botulinum, are different: their heat-resistant spores can survive normal processing. The 2025 ByHeart botulism outbreak prompted the FDA and international food-standards bodies to begin a formal risk assessment of spore-forming organisms in powdered infant formula. At the Reagan-Udall Foundation’s July 2026 roundtable, a Cornell University dairy microbiologist described spores as ubiquitous in soil, manure, bedding and silage, tracing the routes by which they move from those sources to the cow’s teat and into bulk tank milk, noted that weather may be significant to spore transmission on organic dairy farms when cows are on pasture, and cautioned that processing technologies such as bacterial centrifugation and microfiltration can meaningfully reduce spore loads but are not a complete solution.[37]

Related findings in soft, high-moisture dairy products, such as Italian mascarpone cheese, and in raw milk associated with bovine botulism confirm that C. botulinum can and does contaminate the dairy matrix when conditions allow.[38] It is becoming apparent that dried milk product, such as infant formula, is equally vulnerable to contamination. The studies significant to the link between botulism and infant formula, beyond the current outbreaks, are summarized below:

SourceWhat was testedKey finding
Nadala et al., Front. Microbiol., 2026 (USA)Unopened formula containers and bulk “base powder” (formula before packaging)C. botulinum found in both finished product and base powder, even where the usual indicator organism was non-detectable, so standard screening would have missed it.
Brett et al., J. Med. Microbiol., 2005 (UK, 2001 case)14 home foods from a 5-month-old with infant botulismType B C. botulinum recovered from an opened can of infant formula milk powder; two product isolates matched the infant’s isolate by the molecular typing methods then available.
Luo et al., Chinese J. Food Hygiene, 2023 (China)30 batches of infant formula milk powder from a company tied to a botulism caseWhile its toxin was not detected directly, C. botulinum (type B) was isolated from one batch of milk powder.
Barash et al., J. Pediatr., 2010 (USA)30 patient-used formula samples and nine market-bought formulasClostridium spores in 17% of patient-used and 78% of market formulas — but none were C. botulinum (they were related Clostridium species).

Full citations for the studies above appear at notes 41, 43 and 44, infra.[39]

The literature also establishes both the historical rarity of C. botulinum in commercial dried milk and formula, and the singular significance of the 2025 and 2026 outbreaks:

  • Until 2025, C. botulinum was essentially never found in commercial dried milk or formula. Dedicated surveys, including nonfat dry milk, evaporated milk, and canned formula, historically tested negative.[40]
  • Fluid and raw milk have been found to sometimes carry the organism and toxin due to bovine botulism, and these spores also survive pasteurization, although pasteurization strongly degrades pre-formed toxin.[41]
  • Earlier formula links were single cases with caveats. A 2001 United Kingdom case and a 2023 Chinese investigation each recovered the organism from formula milk powder, but causation was never firmly proven.[42]
  • The 2025 ByHeart outbreak is the turning point and the strongest evidence of milk-powder risk to date. Whole-genome sequencing tied type A C. botulinum in organic whole milk powder to the strain in finished formula and to the strain in sick infants across multiple states.[43]
  • The 2026 Nara Organics outbreak extended the above link to a second brand: an infant who had never consumed ByHeart formula carried a strain indistinguishable from the one in ByHeart’s sealed cans and base powder, with the shared milk powder as the only common element.[44]

In short, across decades of research, C. botulinum in commercial dried milk or formula was always possible but rarely detected until 2025. That rarity of detection is precisely what makes the clear and complete genetic evidence in these recent outbreaks so revealing of the products’ defective and adulterated condition.

C.  The Outbreak Summary

On Friday, June 12, 2026, the FDA and CDC contacted Nara Organics with information about three infants in California, Washington, and Pennsylvania who had been hospitalized with infant botulism after consuming Nara formula. Nara initiated a recall of every lot on the market that day and announced it the next. A fourth case was added in July, and on August 27, 2026, the CDC declared the outbreak over.

Outbreak Summary Facts
FeatureSummary
ProductNara Organics Whole Milk Organic Powdered Infant Formula, 700g (UPC 860013251901) and 400g (UPC 860013251918); manufactured in Germany; sold nationally through Target retail stores, Target.com and Nara.com from July 2025 to June 2026; not distributed outside the United States
Case Count (final)4 infants, all confirmed; no cases added after the July 6, 2026, update
StatesCalifornia (2), Pennsylvania (1), Washington (1)
OutcomesAll 4 infants hospitalized and treated with BabyBIG; no deaths reported
Illness OnsetApril 20, May 17, May 20 and May 31, 2026
Investigation StatusCDC declared the outbreak over on August 27, 2026; FDA’s root cause investigation remains open
Toxin TypeType A
Laboratory EvidenceC. botulinum detected in an open can of Nara formula fed to one of the ill infants; whole genome sequencing of the Washington infant’s (I.N.’s) clinical isolate was closely related (5 SNPs) to a clinical isolate from the 2025 ByHeart outbreak, a ByHeart base powder sample, and four samples of unopened cans of ByHeart formula
SourceThe Nara lots linked to illness were made with organic whole milk supplied by Organic West Milk and spray dried by Dairy Farmers of America — the same suppliers implicated in the 2025 ByHeart outbreak; FDA concluded the sequencing match and the shared supply chain indicate a common source of contamination between the two outbreaks; FDA has not determined whether the milk was contaminated before or during drying, and its incident summary states that the evidence was not sufficient to confirm the sources and routes of contamination
RecallInitiated June 12 and announced June 13, 2026: all sixteen Nara Organics infant formula lots on the market, including the three lots the first three infants were fed (709125280E14F2, 709125288E14F2 and 708125174E14F2)

Sources: see note 46.[45]

D.  The FDA and CDC Investigations

The investigation began with that June 12 call. The three infants the agencies described to Nara had been fed lots 709125280E14F2, 709125288E14F2 and 708125174E14F2. Nara initiated the recall that day, and on June 13 it announced the recall of those and 13 other lots that were on the market at the time while stating that, “[t]o date, Nara infant formula has not tested positive for C. botulinum.”[46]

In June 2026, the FDA reported three known, confirmed C. botulinum type A cases with onsets in April and May 2026. It also reported that the Nara lots linked to these cases had been made with milk supplied by Organic West Milk and spray dried by Dairy Farmers of America, the same suppliers of organic whole milk powder implicated in the ByHeart outbreak. Notably, the customer list Organic West Milk had given the FDA during the ByHeart outbreak investigation did not disclose that Organic West Milk also supplied the manufacturer of Nara Organics formula.[47] On July 6, 2026, the CDC and FDA reports included a fourth case, from California, and reported that laboratory testing had detected C. botulinum in an open can of Nara Organics formula, fed to one of the outbreak cases.[48]

On August 27, 2026, the CDC declared the outbreak over and stated that traceback and laboratory data showed that Nara Organics Whole Milk Organic Infant Formula was contaminated and made infants sick. CDC reported that whole genome sequencing had linked a case sample from this outbreak to patient, product, and ingredient samples from the prior 2025 ByHeart outbreak, and that the formulas sold by both Nara Organics and ByHeart were made with milk supplied by Organic West Milk and spray dried by Dairy Farmers of America,[49] leading the FDA to conclude that the matching sequencing results, together with the supply chain commonalities, indicate a common source of contamination between the two outbreaks, while also stating that there is not yet enough evidence to determine whether the milk was contaminated before drying or during the drying process. The FDA’s incident summary for the Nara investigation identifies the case whose isolate matched: it was the Washington clinical isolate — I.N.’s. The summary also confirms the ingredient supplier commonalities between the two investigations, records that a firm whose name the FDA redacted was placed on Import Alert 40-05 on June 25, 2026, and states that the evidence was not sufficient to confirm the sources and routes of contamination.[50]

The FDA’s incident record follows liquid whole milk from twenty dairies that was delivered to Dairy Farmers of America’s plant in Fallon, Nevada, where it was spray dried into organic whole milk powder; then Organic West Milk, acting as broker, sold that powder to formula manufacturers and delivered it to them by a third-party carrier.[51] Nara’s own account of its supply chain confirms that, from October 2024 to April 2025, Nara purchased whole milk from Organic West Milk, which was turned into milk powder at Dairy Farmers of America in Nevada, and that powder went into the formula Nara manufactured in Germany and sold in the United States at the time of the outbreak.

The ByHeart outbreak investigation had already established that the powder from the same supply chain carried viable C. botulinum. At least seventeen product samples tested positive in the ByHeart outbreak investigation — five of them were the organic whole milk powder. Whole genome sequencing sorted the outbreak isolates into seventeen strains, and two of those strains directly linked the Dairy Farmers of America milk to ByHeart’s milk powder and finished product, which was also linked to an unopened can from an Arizona case’s home and to a New Jersey infant case. 

The recovery of the outbreak organism from unopened formula cans denies any suggestion that the strain that infected the outbreak cases was introduced in a home, in retail, or after a seal was broken; it was present in formula made from contaminated milk before the formula left the manufacturer.[52] Similarly, the identification of a second wave of infant botulism cases following ByHeart’s recall and closeout of its own outbreak suggests that the original source was not yet fully identified and dealt with. Likewise, two infants with botulism who were fed different brands of formula, manufactured by different companies on different continents, were linked to outbreaks seven months apart; the only link between the two cases was the dairy ingredient their formulas shared, which points to the original source of contamination. All these details clearly indicate that milk and/or milk powder were the original source of contamination in both recent infant botulism outbreaks. 

The FDA completed its onsite inspections of ByHeart’s facilities without identifying any facility deficiency that could explain the root cause and has said that its root cause investigation is focused on incoming ingredients and the dairy supply chain. In its presentation to the Reagan-Udall Foundation roundtable in July 2026, ByHeart reported that all 472 environmental tests at its Iowa and Oregon facilities were negative for C. botulinum and that the only ingredient confirmed positive by culture was whole milk powder — they stated that their own internal investigation with their outside laboratory and consultants, and the FDA, had identified the common source of C. botulinum as the whole milk powder. ByHeart has since delisted the supplier.[53]

The ByHeart outbreak records also show why Nara Organics was not identified at the time. On January 28 and February 3, 2026, FDA’s CORE team issued traceability assignments to six firms that had received lots of Organic West Milk powdered milk that tested positive for C. botulinum, asking for all distribution of that powder to infant formula manufacturers over the prior two years. The result: “None of the firms identified any infant formula manufacturers as customers that were supplied whole milk powder.” Separately, the customer list Organic West Milk itself had given the FDA during the ByHeart investigation omitted Nara Organics.[54]

In late January 2026, the Associated Press reported that Organic West Milk and Dairy Farmers of America’s Fallon, Nevada plant were the source of the botulism-positive milk powder in the ByHeart outbreak and quoted Dairy Farmers of America’s statement that the powder had met all required tests.[55] Nara Organics learned from those media reports “in early 2026” that Organic West Milk and Dairy Farmers of America supplied ByHeart. The company then conducted a “rigorous review” of its existing formula containing Organic West Milk, confirmed that its whole milk powder lots did not match those in the implicated ByHeart formula, reviewed its sulfite-reducing clostridia results, and consequently “determined that Nara formula could stay on the market.” As late as June 23, 2026, ten days after their recall, Nara was still stating that “to date, there have been no positive tests or evidence of C. botulinum in Nara’s formula supply chain.”[56] The four infants linked to the Nara outbreak became ill in April and May 2026, while formula made with that milk remained on sale.

E.  Issues with Nara’s Response

Nara has stated in its June 13, 2026, recall notice, its June 23, 2026, supply chain page, and its August 27, 2026, update that it intends to return the product to market with European dairy and “rigorous C. botulinum testing protocols.” That recall notice also stated that Nara formula “has not tested positive for C. botulinum.” Three weeks later the CDC reported that it had: on July 6, 2026, the agencies announced that the organism had been recovered from an open can of Nara formula fed to one of the ill infants.[57]

Its August 27 update says that the FDA’s finding “may be linked to one of our former dairy suppliers.” The FDA, by contrast, states the finding directly: that the matching sequencing results and the supply chain commonalities indicate a common source of contamination between the two infant formula outbreaks. Nara’s update then devotes most of its length to what the sequencing could not do — that the infant’s strain did not match the open can from the family’s home, that the other two infants’ strains were unique in the NCBI database and do not match each other, and that the open can is not linked to anything — and closes by stating that FDA’s tests on sealed cans of Nara formula “have returned negative for C. botulinum toxin type A and toxin type B.”[58] The update, however, concedes that C. botulinum was recovered from a can of Nara formula.

First, the FDA identified seventeen distinct strains from patient, product and ingredient samples in the ByHeart outbreak, and it attributed the breadth of contamination to the distribution and cross-contamination of the ingredients.[59]As such, an open can that was sampled from an infant’s home weeks after the illness and found to be carrying a different strain than that of the infant is not remarkable, since many strains were associated with the outbreak. Second, a strain that is absent from a public database of environmental C. botulinum sequences indicates that the database is thin, not that the illness is unexplained. What the update passes over in a single sentence is the match that the FDA did find, which links I.N.’s own clinical isolate, at five SNPs, to four sealed cans of ByHeart formula, which were made from the same milk product as the Nara infant formula, and the undeniable association between the ingredients and the cases. 

Third, infant botulism is caused by swallowed spores that germinate and produce toxin inside an infant’s intestine; the toxin is made in the baby, not in the product. The detectable hazard in a can of formula is the spore, and a negative toxin result on a sealed can does not show that the lot was free of spores. That said, there is no standardized method for finding those spores; the FDA’s own outbreak workflow is pending validation; and the Reagan-Udall Foundation’s report on its July 2026 roundtable states that, on the data presented, this contamination should be considered non-homogeneous and to occur at very low levels, which makes detection significantly more difficult. The FDA itself has cautioned that a negative test does not rule out the organism in a product.[60]

The testing Nara relies on is the testing that failed. Nara screens each batch for sulfite-reducing clostridia as a proxy for C. botulinum and reports every result at or below the limit of detection. The 2026 JEMRA expert group concluded that hygiene indicators do not replace or reduce the need for pathogen-specific testing; the peer-reviewed analysis of the ByHeart product found C. botulinum in finished formula and base powder where the usual indicator organism was non-detectable. ByHeart’s own data, presented at the Reagan-Udall Foundation roundtable, make the point directly: every sample in which its laboratory presumptively detected C. botulinum by PCR—17 in finished product, 3 in base powder and 13 in ingredients—had sulfite-reducing clostridia below 10 CFU/g by direct plating, the same below-detection result Nara reports for its batches. ByHeart’s conclusion was that the results show the limited reliability of direct-plating SRC as an indicator, and the Foundation’s report states that trace amounts of spores can be present at levels too low for SRC detection by direct plating and yet enough to make infants sick.[61] Dairy Farmers of America likewise told the Associated Press that its powder met all required tests. Both Nara and Dairy Farmers of America have treated the existing test as a badge of security when the outbreaks and research reveal that the test is in fact faulty.

F.  FDA’s Response

On July 13, 2026, the FDA shared a letter for the infant formula industry — addressed to manufacturers, packagers, distributors, exporters, importers, and retailers involved in the manufacture or distribution of infant formula and infant formula ingredients — signed by Donald A. Prater, DVM, Acting Deputy Commissioner for Food. The letter was a response to the two multistate outbreaks of infant botulism linked to powdered infant formula and a separate cereulide intoxication event traced to a contaminated formula ingredient. The letter declared that a manufacturer’s responsibility for safety and quality extends to every ingredient, every supplier, and every link in the supply chain.[62]

The letter confirms facts central to this claim. It states that FDA collected samples at Dairy Farmers of America, the processor for Organic West Milk; that two samples from one lot of organic whole milk powder matched a clinical sample and an infant formula sample by whole genome sequencing; that its ongoing root-cause investigation is focused on ingredients and their production environments; and that Organic West Milk also supplied Nara Organics, which recalled all lots of its formula after the June 2026 outbreak.[63]

Reiterating its March 2023 letter to the industry, the agency states that suppliers of ingredients that do not receive treatment at the formula plant are still an extension of the manufacturing process. Under 21 C.F.R. Part 106, manufacturers must maintain production and in-process controls from the receipt of raw materials through distribution, including ingredient specifications, quarantine and disposition of nonconforming ingredients, and scheduled audits. Under 21 C.F.R. Part 117, manufacturers and their supply chain partners must implement a food safety plan with a hazard analysis, preventive controls, and a risk-based supply chain program that identifies hazards in ingredients, approves suppliers and verifies them, including by onsite audits.[64]

Most significant for this claim, the FDA directs manufacturers to stay abreast of recall notifications and outbreak investigations, which “may serve as safety signals” that an ingredient or supplier is substandard, and warns that ignoring or downplaying such signals can lead to public health events that could have been avoided. The agency expects manufacturers to act swiftly to assess and address the risk when a contaminated ingredient or supplier concern is identified whether by the FDA or through the manufacturer’s own monitoring.[65] Nara had exactly such a signal. Its milk supplier and spray dryer were publicly identified as the source of botulism-positive milk powder in January 2026. By its own account Nara reviewed the signal, relied on the same indicator testing that had failed to detect the hazard in ByHeart’s product, and left the formula on the market. The four Nara-associated infants became ill over the following four months.

The scientific response has reached the same conclusions. The joint FAO/WHO expert meeting convened in Rome in June 2026 formally added botulinum neurotoxin-producing Clostridia to the priority list of hazards for powdered formula, concluding that dairy ingredients have been demonstrated as a vehicle for such spores; recommended that manufacturers implement supplier risk management programs to address such spores, stating that control starts with on-farm practices; and concluded that hygiene indicators do not replace or reduce the need for pathogen-specific testing. Each of these findings is an acknowledgment that the controls in place when these infants were exposed to finished formula were not adequate.[66]

On September 3, 2026, the Reagan-Udall Foundation for the FDA published its report on a July 13, 2026, roundtable on C. botulinum in powdered infant formula, a meeting convened in collaboration with ByHeart and the International Dairy Foods Association. Even this industry-funded forum arrived at compatible findings. The report states that, before November 2025, C. botulinum had not been demonstrated to cause outbreaks of infant botulism through infant formula, and that the recent outbreaks demonstrated that they can. It states that the industry cannot rely on testing alone to ensure the safety of products for the most vulnerable populations; that direct-plating SRC testing can miss spores present at levels sufficient to make infants sick; that there are no standardized methods for detecting the organism or its spores in infant formula; and that data on the prevalence of C. botulinum on farms and in the supply chain are limited. Its first recommendation is an assessment of that prevalence on farms, along the supply chain and in finished goods, and its seventeenth asks the FDA to provide guidance on fit-for-purpose tests and thresholds and to establish standardized testing methods and requirements.[67]

The FDA’s post-outbreak work has continued since the close-out. In the September 22, 2026, update of its post-outbreak response page, the agency reported that its root cause investigation continues, with its assessment directed at the supply chain and dairy-based ingredients; that a February 2026 surveillance sampling of 48 powdered milk samples from four suppliers to infant formula manufacturers found two samples, both organic nonfat milk powder from a single firm, positive by PCR, with whole genome sequencing confirming Clostridium sporogenes carrying a gene highly associated with botulinum toxin B1; that it has engaged Cornell University’s Pathogenic Spore Consortium on strategies to reduce C. botulinum and other spore-formers in milk; and that it has asked the International Commission on Microbiological Specifications for Foods — the body whose recommendation Nara cites for its sulfite-reducing clostridia screen — to revisit its publication on the usefulness of testing for C. botulinum in powdered infant formula and dairy-based ingredients for infant formula, in light of the recent outbreaks.[68]


[1] Jin, J. (2023). What is botulism? Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), 330(1), 90. https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/issue/330/1

[2] Dabritz, H. A., Chung, C. H., Read, J. S., & Khouri, J. M. (2025). Global occurrence of infant botulism: 2007–2021. Pediatrics, 155(4), e2024068791.

[3] Harris, R. A., & Dabritz, H. A. (2024). Infant botulism: in search of Clostridium botulinum spores. Current Microbiology, 81(10), 306. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00284-024-03828-0

[4] Schneider, K. R., Schneider, R. M. G., Kurdmongkoltham, P., & Bertoldi, B. (2025). Preventing foodborne illness: Clostridium botulinum. https://ask.ifas.ufl.edu/publication/FS104

[5] Harris, R. A., & Dabritz, H. A. (2024). Infant botulism: in search of Clostridium botulinum spores. Current Microbiology, 81(10), 306. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00284-024-03828-0

[6] Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Infant Botulism Outbreak Linked to Infant Formula, November 2025 (update of Mar. 5, 2026), https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-nov-2025/index.html (the outbreak included 28 confirmed cases and 20 probable cases); U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Infant Formula (November 2025) (content current as of June 3, 2026), https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-infant-formula-november-2025 (case counts: 28 confirmed, 20 probable; sample results: opened container of ByHeart formula tested by CDPH and unopened container collected by Arizona, each positive for C. botulinum type A; a sample of base mix matching four isolates from one lot of ByHeart formula reported by a patient; spores are heat-resistant and require special activation before they can be detected; “a negative test result does not rule out the presence of the bacteria in the product”); FDA, Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Powdered Infant Formula (June 2026), supra note 1 (Nara outbreak; milk supplied by Organic West Milk and spray dried by Dairy Farmers of America for both brands); Reagan-Udall Foundation for the FDA, Applying the Science of Infant Formula Safety: Insights from Recent Recall Activity and the Latest Research on C. botulinum (Sept. 2026), https://reaganudall.org/publications/applying-science-infant-formula-safety (report of an invitation-only roundtable held July 13, 2026, convened in collaboration with ByHeart and the International Dairy Foods Association, which provided funding for the project; the report states that listing a contributor does not represent that contributor’s endorsement) [hereinafter Reagan-Udall Report], at 5 (before November 2025, C. botulinum had not been demonstrated to cause outbreaks of infant botulism through its presence in infant formula; the recent U.S. outbreaks demonstrated that pathway), 8–9 (contamination should be considered non-homogeneous and to occur at very low levels; trace amounts of spores can be present at levels too low for detection of sulfite-reducing clostridia by direct plating but enough to make infants sick) & App. B, slide 3, at 22 (CDC investigation summary for the ByHeart outbreak, as presented by ByHeart: 48 cases, 28 confirmed and 20 probable; 48 hospitalizations; no deaths; 17 states; illness onsets Dec. 24, 2023 to Nov. 29, 2025). See also Section II.B, infra.

[7] CDC. Clinical Overview of Infant Botulism. April 24, 2024. https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/hcp/clinical-overview/infant-botulism.html

[8] Rao AK, Sobel J, Chatham-Stephens K, Luquez C. (2021). Clinical Guidelines for Diagnosis and Treatment of Botulism. MMWR Recomm Rep. 2021;70(2):1-30. https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/70/rr/rr7002a1.htm

[9] CDC. Clinical Overview of Infant Botulism. April 24, 2024. https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/hcp/clinical-overview/infant-botulism.html

[10] Rosow LK, Strober JB. Infant Botulism: Review and Clinical Update. Pediatr Neurol. 2015;52(5):487-492. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pediatrneurol.2015.01.006

[11] Dabritz et al., supra note 3; CDC, National Botulism Surveillance Summary, 2021, https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/php/national-botulism-surveillance/2021.html.

[12] Harris & Dabritz, supra note 4; American Family Physician (AAFP), Infant Botulism, https://www.aafp.org/pubs/afp/issues/2002/0401/p1388.html.

[13] CDC. Clinical Overview of Infant Botulism. April 24, 2024. https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/hcp/clinical-overview/infant-botulism.html

[14] CDC, Clinical Overview of Infant Botulism, supra note 8; Jin, supra note 2.

[15] Rao AK, Sobel J, Chatham-Stephens K, Luquez C. (2021). Clinical Guidelines for Diagnosis and Treatment of Botulism. MMWR Recomm Rep. 2021;70(2):1-30. https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/70/rr/rr7002a1.htm

[16] Jeffery IA, Nguyen AD, Karim S. Botulism. [Updated 2024 Nov 25]. In: StatPearls [Internet]. Treasure Island (FL): StatPearls Publishing; 2026 Jan-. Available from: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK459273/

[17] Rao AK, Sobel J, Chatham-Stephens K, Luquez C. (2021). Clinical Guidelines for Diagnosis and Treatment of Botulism. MMWR Recomm Rep. 2021;70(2):1-30. https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/70/rr/rr7002a1.htm

[18] CDC. Clinical Overview of Infant Botulism. April 24, 2024. https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/hcp/clinical-overview/infant-botulism.html

[19] CDC. Investigation Update: Infant Botulism Outbreak, November 2025. March 4, 2026. https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-nov-2025/investigation.html

[20] FDA. Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Infant Formula (November 2025). Content current as of June 3, 2026. https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-infant-formula-november-2025; U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Powdered Infant Formula (June 2026), update of Aug. 27, 2026, https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-powdered-infant-formula-june-2026; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Infant Botulism Outbreak Linked to Powdered Infant Formula, June 2026, and its investigation, locations and timeline subpages, update of Aug. 27, 2026, https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-june-2026/index.html; investigation update at https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-june-2026/investigation.html; Reagan-Udall Report, supra note 7, at 8 (no standardized methods for detecting the organism or its spores in the infant formula industry; only a limited number of laboratories perform testing) & App. D, at 41 (FDA, Summary C. Botulinum Workflow (outbreak): 200 g sample of powdered infant formula or milk powder, enrichment with incubation of up to five days, qPCR, EndoPep mass spectrometry, whole genome sequencing and mouse bioassay; “Interim Workflow, finalization pending method validation and approval”).

[21] Jeffery IA, Nguyen AD, Karim S. Botulism. [Updated 2024 Nov 25]. In: StatPearls [Internet]. Treasure Island (FL): StatPearls Publishing; 2026 Jan-. Available from: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK459273/

[22] CDC. Clinical Overview of Infant Botulism. April 24, 2024. https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/hcp/clinical-overview/infant-botulism.html

[23] Scarborough, A. P., Khouri, J. M., Chung, C. H., Dabritz, H. A., & Read, J. S. (2025). International Experience with Human Botulism Immune Globulin for the Treatment of Infant Botulism. Medical Research Archives, 13(10). https://esmed.org/MRA/mra/article/view/7026

[24] Arnon SS, Schechter R, Maslanka SE, Jewell NP, Hatheway CL, Human Botulism Immune Globulin for the Treatment of Infant Botulism, 354 N. Engl. J. Med. 462 (2006) (the randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled trial of 122 infants described in the text); Scarborough, A. P., Khouri, J. M., Chung, C. H., Dabritz, H. A., & Read, J. S. (2025). International Experience with Human Botulism Immune Globulin for the Treatment of Infant Botulism. Medical Research Archives, 13(10). https://esmed.org/MRA/mra/article/view/7026

[25] Rao AK, Sobel J, Chatham-Stephens K, Luquez C. (2021). Clinical Guidelines for Diagnosis and Treatment of Botulism. MMWR Recomm Rep. 2021;70(2):1-30. https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/70/rr/rr7002a1.htm

[26] Jeffery IA, Nguyen AD, Karim S. Botulism. [Updated 2024 Nov 25]. In: StatPearls [Internet]. Treasure Island (FL): StatPearls Publishing; 2026 Jan-. Available from: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK459273/

[27] Scarborough, A. P., Khouri, J. M., Chung, C. H., Dabritz, H. A., & Read, J. S. (2025). International Experience with Human Botulism Immune Globulin for the Treatment of Infant Botulism. Medical Research Archives, 13(10). https://esmed.org/MRA/mra/article/view/7026

[28] Scarborough, A. P., Khouri, J. M., Chung, C. H., Dabritz, H. A., & Read, J. S. (2025). International Experience with Human Botulism Immune Globulin for the Treatment of Infant Botulism. Medical Research Archives, 13(10). https://esmed.org/MRA/mra/article/view/7026

[29] Morris, V., Wians, R., Wilson, J., & Stevens, G. (2022). Infant Botulism. Journal of Education & Teaching in Emergency Medicine, 7(2), S48. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10332751/

[30] Rosow & Strober, supra note 11.

[31] Scarborough, A. P., Khouri, J. M., Chung, C. H., Dabritz, H. A., & Read, J. S. (2025). International Experience with Human Botulism Immune Globulin for the Treatment of Infant Botulism. Medical Research Archives, 13(10). https://esmed.org/MRA/mra/article/view/7026

[32] CDC EIS Conference. Severity of Illness and Clinical Outcomes of Infants Linked to an Infant Botulism Outbreak Caused by Powdered Infant Formula — United States, 2025. April 17, 2026. https://www.cdc.gov/eis-conference/php/abstracts/infant-botulism-outbreak-caused-by-powdered-infant-formula.html

[33] AAFP, supra note 13; Rosow & Strober, supra note 11; Botulism Sequelae: A Systematic Review, PMC, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12798721/.

[34] Harris, R. A., & Dabritz, H. A. (2024). Infant botulism: in search of Clostridium botulinum spores. Current Microbiology, 81(10), 306. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00284-024-03828-0

[35] FDA. Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Infant Formula (November 2025). Content current as of June 3, 2026. https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-infant-formula-november-2025; Letter from Donald A. Prater, DVM, Acting Deputy Comm’r for Food, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Human Foods Program, to Infant Formula Industry (July 13, 2026), https://www.fda.gov/media/193534/download, at 1 (ByHeart outbreak was the first botulism outbreak definitively tied to infant formula in the United States since infant botulism was first described as a distinct clinical entity nearly fifty years ago); Reagan-Udall Report, supra note 7, at 5 (prior to November 2025, C. botulinum had not been demonstrated to cause outbreaks of infant botulism due to its presence in infant formula, consistent with guidance from the International Commission on Microbiological Specifications for Foods).

[36] Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Infant Botulism Outbreak Linked to Powdered Infant Formula, June 2026, and its investigation, locations and timeline subpages, update of Aug. 27, 2026, https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-june-2026/index.html; investigation update at https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-june-2026/investigation.html (epidemiologic, traceback, and laboratory data showed that Nara Organics Whole Milk Organic Infant Formula was contaminated and made infants sick; data indicate a common source of contamination for this outbreak and the 2025 ByHeart outbreak).

[37] U.S. FDA, FDA’s Actions to Respond to Clostridium botulinum Illnesses Associated with Consumption of Powdered Infant Formula, https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/fdas-actions-respond-clostridium-botulinum-illnesses-associated-consumption-powdered-infant-formula; Contemporary Pediatrics, Infant botulism outbreak linked to powdered formula under FDA investigation, https://www.contemporarypediatrics.com/view/infant-botulism-outbreak-linked-to-powdered-formula-under-fda-investigation; Reagan-Udall Report, supra note 7, App. C, slides 1–19, at 31–40 (Nicole Martin, PhD, Cornell University, Bacterial spore prevalence in the dairy system and mitigation strategies).

[38] Franciosa G, et al., Clostridium botulinum spores and toxin in mascarpone cheese and other milk products, 62 J. Food Prot. 867 (1999), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/10456738/; Aureli P, et al., an outbreak in Italy of botulism associated with a dessert made with mascarpone cream cheese, 16 Eur. J. Epidemiol. 913 (2000), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/11338122/.

[39] Nadala et al., infra note 44 (C. botulinum present in finished product and bulk “base powder,” with genetic identity between a finished lot and a base powder, and detectable even where the usual indicator organism, sulfite-reducing clostridia, was non-detectable — such that standard screening would have missed it); Brett, Johnson and Luo, infra note 43; Barash, infra note 41.

[40] Guilfoyle DE, Yager JF, Survey of infant foods for Clostridium botulinum spores, 66 J. Assoc. Off. Anal. Chem. 1302 (1983), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/6355058/; Barash JR, et al., Clostridial spores in powdered infant formula, J. Pediatr. (2010), https://www.jpeds.com/article/S0022-3476(10)00070-3/fulltext.

[41] Böhnel H, et al., Presence of Clostridium botulinum and botulinum toxin in milk and udder tissue of dairy cows with suspected botulism, Vet. Rec. (2013), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/23585115/; Lindström M, et al., Clostridium botulinum in cattle and dairy products, 50 Crit. Rev. Food Sci. Nutr. 281 (2010), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/20301016/; Weingart OG, et al., The Case of Botulinum Toxin in Milk: Experimental Data, 76 Appl. Environ. Microbiol. 3293 (2010), https://aem.asm.org/content/76/10/3293.full.

[42] Brett MM, et al., A case of infant botulism with a possible link to infant formula milk powder, J. Med. Microbiol. (2005), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16014431/; Johnson EA, et al., Characterization of Clostridium botulinum Strains Associated with an Infant Botulism Case in the United Kingdom, 43 J. Clin. Microbiol. 2602 (2005), https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC1151885; Luo H, et al., Isolation and typing of Clostridium botulinum from milk powder of an enterprise associated with a case of infant botulism, 35 Chinese J. Food Hygiene 1475 (2023), https://doaj.org/article/30d4cb5e20434fad9a47a75d7afcd132.

[43] FDA. Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Infant Formula (November 2025). Content current as of June 3, 2026. https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-infant-formula-november-2025; Nadala C, et al., Detection and characterization of Clostridium botulinum isolated from powdered infant formula, 17 Front. Microbiol. 1800624 (2026), https://doi.org/10.3389/fmicb.2026.1800624 (authors from IEH Laboratories and Consulting Group, the laboratory that performed ByHeart’s microbiological testing, and from ByHeart); Reagan-Udall Report, supra note 7, App. B, slides 10 & 13, at 26–27 (whole genome sequencing clusters linking whole milk powder, base powder, finished product and clinical isolates across laboratories).

[44] U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Powdered Infant Formula (June 2026), update of Aug. 27, 2026, https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-powdered-infant-formula-june-2026 (one Nara Organics clinical isolate matched four samples of unopened cans of ByHeart formula and a ByHeart base powder sample).

[45] U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Powdered Infant Formula (June 2026), update of Aug. 27, 2026, https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-powdered-infant-formula-june-2026; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Infant Botulism Outbreak Linked to Powdered Infant Formula, June 2026, and its investigation, locations and timeline subpages, update of Aug. 27, 2026, https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-june-2026/index.html; investigation update at https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-june-2026/investigation.html; CDC, Investigation Update on Infant Botulism Outbreak, June 2026 (update of July 6, 2026) (four confirmed type A cases: California (2), Pennsylvania (1), Washington (1), all hospitalized and treated with BabyBIG; laboratory testing detected Clostridium botulinum in an open can of Nara Organics formula fed to one of the infants; FDA testing an unopened can from the same lot), https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-june-2026/investigation.html; Nara Organics, Nara Organics Recalls All Lots of Nara Infant Formula Because of Possible Health Risk(company announcement posted by FDA, June 13, 2026), https://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls-market-withdrawals-safety-alerts/nara-organics-recalls-all-lots-nara-infant-formula-because-possible-health-risk; Nara Organics, Nara’s Whole Milk Supply Chain (June 23, 2026), https://nara.com/pages/nara-organics-whole-milk-supplier (formula manufactured in Germany; Organic West Milk purchased October 2024 to April 2025 and spray dried at Dairy Farmers of America in Nevada); Reagan-Udall Report, supra note 7, App. B, slide 3, at 22 (CDC investigation summary for the ByHeart outbreak, as presented by ByHeart: 48 cases and 48 hospitalizations; no deaths; 17 states).

[46] Nara Organics, Nara Organics Recalls All Lots of Nara Infant Formula Because of Possible Health Risk (company announcement posted by FDA, June 13, 2026), https://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls-market-withdrawals-safety-alerts/nara-organics-recalls-all-lots-nara-infant-formula-because-possible-health-risk (FDA and CDC contacted Nara Organics late Friday, June 12, 2026 with three cases; the three infants were hospitalized and treated with BabyBIG in California, Washington, and Pennsylvania; exposure lots 709125280E14F2, 709125288E14F2 and 708125174E14F2; sixteen lot codes recalled; distribution through Target retail stores, Target.com and Nara.com between July 2025 and June 2026); Nara CORE Summary, supra note 1 (Nara initiated a voluntary recall of all lots on the market on June 12, 2026).

[47] U.S. FDA, Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Powdered Infant Formula (June 2026) (initial June 2026 posting: three confirmed type A infant-botulism cases in California, Pennsylvania, and Washington linked to Nara Organics Whole Milk Organic powdered infant formula, onsets April–May 2026; Organic West Milk and its processor, Dairy Farmers of America, identified as suppliers shared with ByHeart; Organic West Milk’s earlier customer list to FDA was incomplete and omitted Nara Organics), https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-powdered-infant-formula-june-2026.

[48] CDC, Investigation Update on Infant Botulism Outbreak, June 2026 (update of July 6, 2026) (four confirmed type A cases: California (2), Pennsylvania (1), Washington (1), all hospitalized and treated with BabyBIG; laboratory testing detected Clostridium botulinum in an open can of Nara Organics formula fed to one of the infants; FDA testing an unopened can from the same lot), https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-june-2026/investigation.html.

[49] Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Infant Botulism Outbreak Linked to Powdered Infant Formula, June 2026, and its investigation, locations and timeline subpages, update of Aug. 27, 2026, https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-june-2026/index.html; investigation update at https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-june-2026/investigation.html (no new cases added since the July 6, 2026 update; four cases; whole genome sequencing linked a patient sample from this outbreak to a patient sample, product samples, and an ingredient sample collected during the 2025 ByHeart investigation; the formulas sold by both Nara Organics and ByHeart were made with milk supplied by Organic West Milk and spray dried by Dairy Farmers of America).

[50] U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Powdered Infant Formula (June 2026), update of Aug. 27, 2026, https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-powdered-infant-formula-june-2026 (one clinical sample from an infant in this outbreak is a genetic match to a clinical sample from an infant in the 2025 ByHeart outbreak, a powdered infant formula base sample from the ByHeart investigation, and four samples of unopened cans of ByHeart powdered infant formula; Nara Organics lots linked to illness were made with milk supplied by Organic West Milk and spray dried by Dairy Farmers of America; matching WGS results and supply-chain commonalities indicate a common source of contamination; not enough evidence to determine whether milk was contaminated before drying or during the drying process; root cause investigation ongoing); Nara CORE Summary, supra note 1 (CDPH sequenced the open-can isolate and three clinical isolates, California (2) and Washington (1); the Washington clinical isolate was closely related (5 SNPs) to one clinical, one powdered infant formula base and four unopened-can isolates from the 2025 ByHeart investigation; the two California clinical isolates and the open-can isolate were not closely related to existing isolates in the national database; firm placed on Import Alert 40-05 on June 25, 2026 (name redacted); evidence not sufficient to confirm sources and routes of contamination).

[51] CORE Record, Executive Incident Summary at 3–6, 8–9 (assignments 3–5; Tables 1–2; WGS strains 2 and 11; Traceback Abbreviated Summary); ICS 202, entries of Nov. 25, 2025 (traceback records: liquid whole milk supplied by twenty dairies to Dairy Farmers of America, Fallon, Nev., where it is spray-dried into organic whole-milk powder; Organic West Milk acts as a broker and uses a third-party carrier to deliver the powder), Jan. 21, 2026 (FDA firm call informing Dairy Farmers of America, ByHeart, and Organic West Milk of the positive sample and whole-genome sequencing results), and Feb. 9, 2026 (FDA firm call with Dairy Farmers of America and Organic West Milk on FDA Sample #1319424). U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Coordinated Outbreak Response and Evaluation (CORE) Network, Executive Incident Summary: Clostridium botulinum/Infant Formula/Nov 2025, CARA #1350 (May 1, 2026), released with Incident Objectives (ICS 202, Operational Period #7), Incident Briefing (ICS 201, CORE Incident No. 1350), Human Foods Program Signal Detection & Bioinformatics Branch, WGS Analysis Report: WGS-Report-ByHeart-260224 (Feb. 24, 2026), and Human Foods Program Health Hazard Evaluation, HHE #11418, RES #97959 (Dec. 5, 2025), in response to FOIA Request No. 2026-4033 (redacted under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4), (b)(5), (b)(6) and (b)(7)(D)) [hereinafter CORE Record]; Nara Organics, Nara’s Whole Milk Supply Chain (June 23, 2026), supra note 46 (Nara’s own account: whole milk purchased from Organic West Milk from October 2024 to April 2025, spray dried at Dairy Farmers of America in Nevada, and used in the formula Nara manufactured in Germany and sold in the United States at the time of the outbreak).

[52] U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Powdered Infant Formula (June 2026), update of Aug. 27, 2026, https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-powdered-infant-formula-june-2026; Nara Organics, August 27 Update (Aug. 27, 2026), https://nara.com/pages/formula-recall-update-august-27-2026 (Nara’s own summary of the FDA sequencing: one clinical sample “clustered with a strain of C. botulinum found in a ByHeart clinical patient sample from 2025, as well as base powder and unopened cans of ByHeart formula powder”; the other two clinical isolates and the open-can isolate matched nothing in the NCBI database).

[53] CORE Record, Executive Incident Summary at 5–10 (Laboratory Sample Overview, Tables 1–4; WGS analysis; Traceback Abbreviated Summary) (at least seventeen product samples positive for C. botulinum: eight finished-formula, four base-mix, five whole-milk-powder; FDA’s two positives were a base-mix retain from Blendhouse Allerton, Iowa and a powdered-milk retain from Dairy Farmers of America, Fallon, Nevada; a second Dairy Farmers of America milk-powder retain was positive at the New York State Wadsworth Center; strain 11 links two FDA milk-powder isolates, three ByHeart whole-milk-powder isolates, a ByHeart finished-product isolate, an unopened can from an Arizona case household, and a New Jersey clinical isolate at a mean of 7.5 SNPs; strain 2 links a ByHeart finished-product isolate from lot 251261P2 to a second Dairy Farmers of America milk-powder retain at eight SNPs); see also U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Post-Outbreak Response Activities: Clostridium botulinum Illnesses Associated with Consumption of Powdered Infant Formula (content current as of Sept. 22, 2026), https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/post-outbreak-response-activities-clostridium-botulinum-illnesses-associated-consumption-powdered (two isolates from one lot of organic whole milk powder sampled at Dairy Farmers of America matched a clinical isolate and a positive finished-formula sample; no ByHeart facility deficiency identified that could explain the root cause; ongoing root-cause investigation focused on incoming ingredients and the dairy supply chain); Reagan-Udall Report, supra note 7, App. B, slides 9, 13, 16 & 18, at 25, 27–29 (ByHeart presentation: environmental testing at Allerton, Iowa (406 tests) and Portland, Oregon (66 tests), all negative for C. botulinum; one culture-confirmed positive ingredient, whole milk powder; IEH Laboratories found nine C. botulinum positives among 4,675 samples and concluded that the contamination originated from the whole milk powder ingredient, not from ByHeart’s manufacturing processes; FDA whole genome sequencing cluster including one clinical isolate, two closed powdered infant formula samples, and five isolates from the same lot of organic whole milk powder (three tested by ByHeart and two by FDA), including samples collected at Dairy Farmers of America, the processor for Organic West Milk; “Internal, external and FDA investigations identified a common C. botulinum source in whole milk powder”; whole milk powder supplier delisted; entry point into the ingredient not yet established).

[54] CORE Record, Executive Incident Summary at 4–5 (Field Investigations & Findings, assignments 7–12); ICS 202, entry of Jan. 28, 2026 (“None of the firms identified any infant formula manufacturers as customers that were supplied whole milk powder.”); U.S. FDA, Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Powdered Infant Formula (June 2026) (initial June 2026 posting: three confirmed type A infant-botulism cases in California, Pennsylvania, and Washington linked to Nara Organics Whole Milk Organic powdered infant formula, onsets April–May 2026; Organic West Milk and its processor, Dairy Farmers of America, identified as suppliers shared with ByHeart; Organic West Milk’s earlier customer list to FDA was incomplete and omitted Nara Organics), https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-powdered-infant-formula-june-2026 (Organic West Milk’s customer list was incomplete and omitted Nara Organics); Nara Organics, Nara Organics Recalls All Lots of Nara Infant Formula Because of Possible Health Risk (company announcement posted by FDA, June 13, 2026), https://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls-market-withdrawals-safety-alerts/nara-organics-recalls-all-lots-nara-infant-formula-because-possible-health-risk (Nara Organics formula distributed from July 2025).

[55] Associated Press, Companies that supplied dried milk powder linked to botulism outbreak identified, republished by ABC News (Jan. 28, 2026), https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/companies-supplied-dried-milk-powder-linked-botulism-byheart-129650215 (naming Organic West Milk and the Dairy Farmers of America plant in Fallon, Nevada as the source of the botulism-positive milk powder; Dairy Farmers of America statement that the milk powder met all required tests; Bill Van Ryn, an owner of Organic West Milk, stating that the company “didn’t sell organic whole milk powder to any infant formula maker besides ByHeart”).

[56] Nara Organics, Nara’s Whole Milk Supply Chain (June 23, 2026), https://nara.com/pages/nara-organics-whole-milk-supplier (“When we learned from media reports in early 2026 that Organic West and DFA supplied ByHeart, we immediately began a rigorous review to determine the safety of Nara’s existing formula containing Organic West milk”; “it was determined that Nara formula could stay on the market”; whole milk powder lots did not overlap with ByHeart’s; sulfite-reducing clostridia results ≤10 CFU/g on every batch; “to date, there have been no positive tests or evidence of c. botulinum in Nara’s formula supply chain”).

[57] Nara Organics, Nara Organics Recalls All Lots of Nara Infant Formula Because of Possible Health Risk (company announcement posted by FDA, June 13, 2026), https://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls-market-withdrawals-safety-alerts/nara-organics-recalls-all-lots-nara-infant-formula-because-possible-health-risk (“To date, Nara infant formula has not tested positive for C. botulinum.”); compare CDC, Investigation Update on Infant Botulism Outbreak, June 2026 (update of July 6, 2026) (four confirmed type A cases: California (2), Pennsylvania (1), Washington (1), all hospitalized and treated with BabyBIG; laboratory testing detected Clostridium botulinum in an open can of Nara Organics formula fed to one of the infants; FDA testing an unopened can from the same lot), https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-june-2026/investigation.html.

[58] Nara Organics, August 27 Update (Aug. 27, 2026), https://nara.com/pages/formula-recall-update-august-27-2026.

[59] FDA. Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Infant Formula (November 2025). Content current as of June 3, 2026. https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-infant-formula-november-2025 (whole-genome sequencing identified 17 distinct strains across patient, product, and ingredient samples in the ByHeart outbreak); CORE Record, Executive Incident Summary at 10 (“[t]he distribution and comingling of ingredients likely contributed to the widespread nature of the contamination”).

[60] Nara Organics, August 27 Update (Aug. 27, 2026), https://nara.com/pages/formula-recall-update-august-27-2026 (“All their tests on sealed cans of Nara infant formula have returned negative for C. botulinum toxin type A and toxin type B.”); CDC, Clinical Overview of Infant Botulism, supra note 8 (infant botulism results from ingestion of spores that germinate and produce toxin in the intestine); Reagan-Udall Report, supra note 7, at 8–9 & App. D, at 41; FDA, Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Infant Formula (November 2025), supra note 21 (“a negative test result does not rule out the presence of the bacteria in the product”).

[61] Nara Organics, Nara’s Whole Milk Supply Chain (June 23, 2026), https://nara.com/pages/nara-organics-whole-milk-supplier (ICMSF-recommended sulfite-reducing clostridia screening at a suggested maximum of <100 CFU/g; all Nara batches ≤10 CFU/g, the limit of detection); Joint FAO/WHO Expert Meeting on Microbiological Risk Assessment (JEMRA) on Powdered Formula for Infants and Young Children, FAO HQ, Rome, Italy, June 15–19, 2026, Summary and Conclusions (issued July 2026) (hygiene indicators such as Enterobacteriaceae monitoring do not replace or reduce the need for pathogen-specific testing during environmental monitoring); Nadala et al., supra note 44; Reagan-Udall Report, supra note 7, at 9 & App. B, slide 11, at 26 (sulfite-reducing clostridia results for C. botulinum PCR presumptive positives: finished product (17), base powder (3) and ingredients (13), all <10 CFU/g; “Results demonstrate limited reliability of SRC by direct plating as an indicator”).

[62] Letter from Donald A. Prater, DVM, Acting Deputy Comm’r for Food, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Human Foods Program, to Infant Formula Industry (July 13, 2026), https://www.fda.gov/media/193534/download, at 1 (letter directed to manufacturers, packagers, distributors, exporters, importers, and retailers involved in the manufacture or distribution of infant formula and infant formula ingredients; issued in response to two multistate outbreaks of infant botulism linked to powdered infant formula and to cereulide intoxication associated with a contaminated ingredient; a manufacturer’s responsibility for safety and quality extends to every ingredient, every supplier, and every link in the supply chain).

[63] Id. at 1–2 (FDA inspected and collected samples at Dairy Farmers of America, Inc., the processor for Organic West Milk, which supplied ByHeart; two samples from one lot of organic whole milk powder matched a clinical sample and an infant formula sample by whole genome sequencing; ongoing root-cause investigation focused on ingredients and their production environments; Organic West Milk also supplied Nara Organics, which voluntarily recalled all lots of its powdered infant formula).

[64] Id. at 2–3 (reiterating FDA’s March 2023 Letter to the Powdered Infant Formula Industry that suppliers of raw materials or other ingredients that will not receive a lethal treatment at the infant formula manufacturing facility are an extension of the infant formula manufacturing process; production and in-process control obligations under 21 C.F.R. Part 106; food safety plan, preventive control, and supply-chain program obligations under 21 C.F.R. Part 117, including subpart G supplier verification; redundancy risk management plan requirement of section 424(b) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. § 350m(b)).

[65] Id. at 3–4 (recall notifications, outbreak investigations, and import alerts may serve as safety signals that an identified ingredient or supplier presents risk; ignoring or downplaying such signals can lead to public health events that could have been avoided; FDA expects manufacturers to act swiftly to assess and address the risk when a contaminated ingredient or supplier concern is identified, whether by FDA or through the manufacturer’s own monitoring).

[66] Joint FAO/WHO Expert Meeting on Microbiological Risk Assessment (JEMRA) on Powdered Formula for Infants and Young Children, FAO HQ, Rome, Italy, June 15–19, 2026, Summary and Conclusions (issued July 2026) (adding botulinum neurotoxin-producing clostridia to the priority hazard group for powdered formula; finding that dairy ingredients have been demonstrated as a vehicle for such spores resulting in contamination of powdered formula; recommending supplier risk management programs; stating that control starts with on-farm practices; stating that hygiene indicators do not replace or reduce the need for pathogen-specific testing; noting that current consumer preparation recommendations designed for Salmonella and Cronobacter spp. may not be effective against these spores; recommending revisions to CXC 66-2008). The summary notes that a full report will be published by FAO and WHO, and its Annex 2 recommendations carry the disclaimer that they may be updated following availability of risk assessment results.

[67] Reagan-Udall Report, supra note 7, at 1, 4–5, 7–10, 16, 20–21 & 44 (funding by ByHeart and the International Dairy Foods Association; roundtable of July 13, 2026; illness pathway demonstrated by the recent outbreaks; prevalence data on farms and in the supply chain limited; no standardized detection methods; testing alone cannot ensure quality or food safety; limitations of sulfite-reducing clostridia testing by direct plating; Recommendations 1 and 17; contributors’ inclusion does not represent endorsement).

[68] U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Post-Outbreak Response Activities: Clostridium botulinum Illnesses Associated with Consumption of Powdered Infant Formula (content current as of Sept. 22, 2026), https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/post-outbreak-response-activities-clostridium-botulinum-illnesses-associated-consumption-powdered (February 2026 surveillance sampling: 48 powdered milk samples from four suppliers to infant formula manufacturers, 46 negative by PCR; two organic nonfat milk powder samples from the same firm positive by PCR, with whole genome sequencing confirming Clostridium sporogenes carrying a gene highly associated with botulinum toxin B1, the two sequences nearly identical, no match to any clinical or non-clinical sequence previously reported, and the powder confirmed not to have been used to manufacture infant formula; continued root cause investigation “including assessment of the supply chain and dairy-based ingredients”; engagement with Cornell University’s Pathogenic Spore Consortium; request that the International Commission on Microbiological Specifications for Foods revisit its publication “Usefulness of testing for Clostridium botulinum in powdered infant formula and dairy-based ingredients for infant formula”; Reagan-Udall report released September 3, 2026); Nara Organics, Nara’s Whole Milk Supply Chain (June 23, 2026), supra note 57 (ICMSF-recommended sulfite-reducing clostridia screening).

Saturday, October 31, 2026

Last Saturday’s edition was about two sets of books — the record the agencies keep and the one they publish. This week (week 17) the published record started saying what the working record already knew, some of it in writing from people who rarely put things in writing. The Justice Department told FDA that its own regulations keep supply-chain names secret and that it can rewrite them. CDC stopped saying Little Wicomico River oysters may be making people sick and said they did. FDA marked the chicken wrap outbreak ended and wrote that telling consumers more would have given them nothing to do. A federal workgroup wrote that forty years of national targets have not moved Salmonella. And three county health departments wrote, release after release, that children who visited a pumpkin patch or a petting zoo are in intensive care. That is where this week starts.

Three animal-contact outbreaks in three states put ten confirmed and seventeen suspected STEC infections on the record in one week, and three of the confirmed cases have hemolytic uremic syndrome. San Luis Obispo County Public Health said Friday it has five laboratory-confirmed E. coliO157 infections and eight more people with matching symptoms who visited Brookshire Farms between October 16 and October 26; three of the confirmed cases have HUS, a fourth was hospitalized and released, and the farm will stay closed for the season. The Will County Health Department is still at five confirmed Shiga toxin-producing E. coli cases, ages four to thirty-eight, tied to the petting zoo at Bengtson’s Pumpkin Farm in Homer Glen, Illinois, four of them hospitalized; more than two hundred visitor surveys are under review, animal, bedding and water samples went to the state lab Monday, and the petting zoo is closed while the rest of the farm stays open through November 8. Dallas County’s health director told reporters the county is looking at nine suspected cases in children who visited the State Fair of Texas petting zoo, some in intensive care at two hospitals; the fair says it has no confirmed link, and as of Friday the county’s press release page carried nothing about it. I wrote this week about twenty-five years of outbreaks exactly like these, about the county whose first concrete advice was about washing the pumpkins, and about the thirteen-person count. At Food Safety News I answered my own twenty-two-year-old question about banning petting zoos: not all of them, but no contact between children under five and the highest-risk animals, no animal contact anywhere without soap and running water at the exit, and no petting zoo without a permit. The firm has been retained by the family of a hospitalized Brookshire Farms visitor and is investigating for a Bengtson’s family.

CDC dropped the hedge on the oysters Friday, and the count moved to twenty-eight sick in thirteen states. The October 30 update says oysters harvested by Little Wicomico Oyster Company from the Little Wicomico River made people sick in this outbreak; the October 19 notice had said they may be. Five of twenty-two people with information were hospitalized, nobody has died, and illnesses now run from May 29 to October 6 — the first onset inside the September 18 to October 8 harvest window the recall covers. Eleven of fourteen people interviewed ate raw oysters, against 1.6 percent in CDC’s population survey. The Pennsylvania distributor sample turned out to be Salmonella Litchfield, which matches no sick person, so the laboratory link now rests on Virginia’s river oysters, some of which carried the outbreak strain alongside Salmonella Newport and Salmonella Hartford. Virginia’s own page, re-dated Friday, adds that the second round of four hundred oysters pulled October 21 came back positive from three of four leases with sequencing pending, that fecal samples taken October 22 and public harvest grounds sampled October 26 have no results posted, and that the river stays closed until three consecutive rounds come back clean. Virginia now counts only three of its own residents plus CDC’s cluster; the fifty-five sick in nineteen states it posted October 21 is no longer on the page. The company’s website notice says a voluntary recall was conducted at the state’s direction and never uses the word Salmonella. I asked last Saturday how the bacteria got into the river and wrote Friday about what the dropped hedge means. The firm filed suit this week in federal court in Colorado against Whole Foods Market Rocky Mountain/Southwest and The Little Wicomico Oyster Company for a Lafayette woman who bought a dozen raw oysters at the Superior store on June 5 — a hundred and five days before the first harvest date the recall reaches.

The Justice Department put in writing Monday what FDA has spent a decade saying it could not do, and two days later FDA closed the chicken wrap outbreak with a sentence that proves the point. The Office of Legal Counsel’s eight-page opinion to the Acting General Counsel of HHS, dated October 26, concludes that under FDA’s current regulations the agency is generally not authorized to disclose supply-chain information, that the enforcement-action exception in 21 CFR 20.91 is exceedingly narrow in practice, and that FDA may amend those regulations under section 705(b) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to authorize disclosure where there is imminent danger to health or gross deception of the consumer. It adds that a rule allowing names to be released after an outbreak has ended would likely be inconsistent with the statute. I rewrote both of my disclosure petitions around the opinion within hours and will file them in November. On Wednesday FDA’s outbreak table marked file #1421, the fifty-person E. coli O157:H7 outbreak tied to Trader Joe’s Tarragon Chicken Salad Wraps, as ended while its investigation stays active; the product column still says suspect wrap. FDA’s explanation, posted on its own page and reported by Food Safety News, is that the illnesses fell in one week in August, the wraps were past shelf life and already pulled before the link was made, and more detailed product information would not have given consumers an action they could take. That is the first epidemiological fact FDA has released about this outbreak, offered to explain why the rest stays sealed; I wrote Thursday about why withholding a confirmed source is the gross deception 705(b) is written for. The same page posted an incident summary for the eighteen-person Cyclospora file #1384: a catered lunch, two hospitalized, no samples collected, and the caterer, the distributor and the states all redacted.

FDA opened a fifty-nine-person file with no food, no traceback, no inspection and no sampling, and the no-food ledger passed six hundred and ninety. Wednesday’s table added reference #1424, Salmonella Javiana, fifty-nine sick, product not yet identified, every action box blank and no CDC notice; the Listeria file #1417 moved from forty-six to fifty with an inspection and sampling under way; the jalapeño file #1395 and the Cyclospora file #1384 moved to the closed list. Fifteen rows remain. Ten name no food and carry 693 illnesses — 630 across nine rows last Saturday — and 743 counting the wrap row. CDC’s dashboardlists twenty-five active multistate investigations, down from twenty-nine: seventeen Salmonella, five E. coli, two Listeria, one Campylobacter. I keep the running record at Food Poison Journal. West Virginia’s health department told its clinicians Thursday it has forty-one Salmonella Typhimurium infections since early September, five hospitalized, ages three to fifty-four, no source identified; the Morgantown cluster stood at sixteen on October 1, and nobody has said whether it is part of the forty-one (my note is here). The pages with sources did not move: CDC’s alfalfa sprout outbreak is still seventy-six sick in sixteen states as of October 1, the Evergreen broccoli sprout outbreak is still thirty-two as of September 24, the Graziers raw milk cheese outbreak is still thirteen sick, eight hospitalized and three with HUS as of September 25, and FDA’s sprout advisory is still dated October 9 and still does not name Wild West Seed. The FSIS outbreak page could not be reached from here all week.

Two companies told FDA no this week, and one of them changed its mind four days later. Haifa Smoked Fish of Jamaica, New York, which declined FDA’s October 23 request to recall cold smoked sprats made without controls for Clostridium botulinum, recalled every lot Tuesday: about 560 pounds, shipped loose in bulk cardboard boxes to retail stores in New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, no lot codes, no retailer names, no illnesses, and a notice that never mentions the refusal (the record is here). Darwin’s Natural Pet Products of Tukwila, Washington, already facing a Justice Department injunction action, drew another FDA advisory Monday for two lots of chicken cat food that sickened two cats, with FDA writing that the firm has not initiated an adequate recall. Vitality Works recalled one lot of 365 Whole Foods Market ashwagandha capsules Friday for Salmonella after routine sampling of a single retail bottle — a lot on sale for eleven months in thirty states, the District of Columbia and on Amazon (details). Imperio Distribution of Elgin, Illinois, recalled about 946 pounds of beef jerky produced without federal inspection and stamped with another plant’s establishment number, shipped to seven Midwestern states; I could not reach the FSIS notice itself, and Phyllis Entis’s ledger at eFoodAlert shows FSIS posted nothing else all week. Her roundups (Friday’s is here) also carry a lead recall of Wise Wife ground cinnamon (FDA notice), a sixty-six-person Salmonella cluster at a hospital in Costa Rica, a 251-person Salmonella outbreak from a fruit ice drink in Indonesia and a waterborne outbreak in Brazil approaching 2,600 cases; her October 24 roundup logged a fifth downstream broccoli-seed recall, Fortuna Marketing’s ZestiGreens sprouting seeds, that I could not verify on FDA’s own database.

FDA proposed the first update to infant formula nutrient standards in nearly thirty years, and the testing page it launched the same day has no row for the bacterium that paralyzed fifty-two babies. The proposed rule, announced Thursday in Des Moines by Secretary Kennedy and Acting Commissioner Diamantas, raises the floor on iodine and vitamin D, lowers the ceiling on vitamin A, sets one for manganese, reaffirms four other nutrients and asks whether DHA, ARA and L-carnitine should be required; comments run until February 26, 2027. Credit where it is due — the new testing page and contaminants dashboard are real transparency. What they report is testing for heavy metals and other chemicals. Nothing on them reports a test for Clostridium botulinum, which hospitalized forty-eight infants in the ByHeart outbreak and four more in the Nara Organics outbreak, every one on BabyBIG and many on ventilators — the reminder I posted Thursday. Comments on my citizen petition to require botulinum testing of finished formula and its dairy ingredients closed Friday, and it goes to the docket next. The same day, Perrigo told the SEC it is selling its store-brand infant formula business for up to $175 million to MeridianMade, the company run by ByHeart’s two founders, while a company spokesperson told Bloomberg that ByHeart itself is discontinued and not coming back — my note on that is here.

A federal workgroup wrote down that forty years of national targets left one pathogen exactly where it was in 1997, and the Washington Post wrote down that FDA has inspected about two percent of the Mexican facilities shipping us produce. The Healthy People Food Safety Workgroup’s paper in the Journal of Food Protection puts Salmonella at 15.2 infections per hundred thousand against a 1997 baseline of 15.3 and a 2030 target of 11.5, with Campylobacter, Shiga toxin-producing E. coli and Listeriaall above their baselines and FoodNet cut from eight pathogens to two last year; my tip of the pen and ten suggestions ran Wednesday. The Post’s analysis found FDA completed 1,024 foreign food inspections last year against a FSMA target of 19,200, and an acting deputy commissioner answered that inspections are not a good proxy for oversight — my note is that Congress sent letters and a newspaper did the oversight. At USDA, the court stay on the reorganization that would move FSIS to Iowa is still in place, and the department sent a new round of reassignment letters anyway Wednesday while the Secretary said the plan is proceeding at full speed. Congress is out until November 9, the continuing resolution runs to December 11, FDA’s lot-level traceability meeting is Friday, November 6, and the comment windows on my raw milk cheese and sprout warning-label petitions closed Friday along with the formula petition; those go to the docket next, and the two disclosure petitions file in November. Everything else waits for the election.

That’s the week — twenty-seven sick after two pumpkin patches and a petting zoo with three children in kidney failure, a government lawyer telling FDA the secrecy is its own rule and FDA answering two days later that you did not need to know, oysters that made people sick in thirteen states with three of four leases still positive, a fifty-nine-person Salmonella outbreak with every box blank, a smoked fish company that said no and then yes, and a formula rule that tests for everything but the thing that put fifty-two babies on BabyBIG. Next week brings the animal and water results from Illinois, Virginia’s third round, a traceability meeting and an election. Check back next Saturday.

About Bill Marler

William “Bill” Marler has spent more than thirty years as a food safety lawyer and advocate, work that began with the 1993 Jack in the Box E. coli outbreak and has never really stopped since. In the years that followed, he has represented victims in nearly every major foodborne illness outbreak in the United States. That case, and the movement it launched, is the subject of the book “Poisoned” and the Emmy Award–winning Netflix documentary of the same name.

Bill’s work has been profiled in The New Yorker (“A Bug in the System”), the Seattle Times (“30 years after the deadly E. coli outbreak, a Seattle attorney still fights for food safety”), the Washington Post (“He helped make burgers safer. Now he’s fighting food poisoning again”), and many others.

Dozens of times a year, Bill speaks to industry, regulators, and universities across the United States, Canada, Europe, Africa, China, and Australia about a simple idea: outbreaks are preventable. He has testified before Congress on the Food Safety Modernization Act and teaches food safety at institutions including the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health. He writes regularly about food litigation and food safety at Marler Blog, and in 2009 he founded Food Safety News, which he continues to publish.

CDC updated its investigation of the Salmonella Telelkebir outbreak linked to raw oysters from Little Wicomico Oyster Company (VA-1421-SP) this morning, October 30, 2026. The count is now 28 sick in 13 states, one new case and one new state since the October 19 notice. Five people have been hospitalized (23 percent of the 22 with information). No deaths.

The bigger change is in the wording. On October 19, CDC said epidemiologic, laboratory and traceback data showed the oysters “may be contaminated” and “may be making people sick.” Today CDC says the oysters harvested by Little Wicomico Oyster Company from the Little Wicomico River “made people sick in this outbreak.” No hedge.

What changed since October 19

The illness window moved. Illnesses now run from May 29 to October 6, 2026. On October 19 the last known onset was September 14, which meant every illness CDC had counted came before the September 18 to October 8 harvest dates in the recall. An October 6 onset falls inside that window. CDC also warns, as it always does, that recent illnesses take three to four weeks to show up in the count.

The food history got stronger. Eleven of 14 people interviewed (79 percent) ate raw oysters in the week before they got sick, compared with 1.6 percent of healthy people in CDC’s FoodNet Population Survey.

The oysters carried the outbreak strain. The Virginia Department of Health pulled oysters from Little Wicomico Oyster Company cages in the river on October 13. Whole genome sequencing showed some samples are the same strain making people sick. Those oysters also carried Salmonella Newport and SalmonellaHartford, which do not match any sick person in PulseNet. CDC now reports sequencing results for six food samples.

The Pennsylvania sample was not a match. The oyster sample Pennsylvania officials took from a distributor that supplied restaurants where sick people ate, the one CDC flagged as Salmonella-positive on October 19, turned out to be Salmonella Litchfield. It does not match any sick person in PulseNet. So the lab link rests on Virginia’s river samples, not Pennsylvania’s.

The recalled oysters are past shelf life. CDC says the recalled oysters should no longer be on the market and nothing is being harvested from the Little Wicomico River right now.

What Virginia is saying

VDH’s October 27 update reports three Virginia residents among the cases. Of the seven sick people with traceback, two ate oysters from a single source, Virginia, and five had multiple possible sources, with the Little Wicomico River the one in common. VDH took a second round of 400 oysters from the company’s cages on October 21 and collected fecal-contamination samples on October 22; those results were not posted as of October 27.

The river stays closed until three consecutive rounds of product testing come back negative. The initial emergency closure runs 30 days from October 9. VDH lists recalled oysters as shipped to Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, New Jersey, Nevada, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Texas.

VDH also added a line I will be reading more than once: to its knowledge, routine and follow-up inspections have not found deficiencies at the company’s dealer facilities that link its operations to the illnesses. That is a statement about the shucking house, not the water. Eight of eight oyster samples from the river tested positive for Salmonella, and the outbreak strain was there.

The bigger Telelkebir picture

The 28 cases are a genetic subcluster. VDH says CDC is investigating additional Salmonella Telelkebir cases beyond the subcluster to figure out where those people got sick; VDH’s October 21 update had put the broader group at 55 cases in 19 states. And this is the second year running for raw oysters and this rare serotype. In December 2025, CDC reported 64 people in 22 states sick with Salmonella Telelkebir after eating raw oysters, and the source was never publicly identified. Someone should be asking whether those two outbreaks share a river.

Our case

Yesterday Marler Clark filed suit in federal court in Colorado against Whole Foods and Little Wicomico Oyster Company on behalf of a Colorado woman who got Salmonella after eating raw oysters bought at Whole Foods in Superior.

What oyster eaters should do

Check the tag. Recalled oysters were harvested from the Little Wicomico River or Little Wicomico River Lower, Virginia, between September 18 and October 8, 2026, by dealer VA-1421-SP. If you have them, throw them out or return them, and wash anything they touched. Restaurants and retailers should keep shellstock tags; they are how investigators find the source.

See a doctor if you have diarrhea with a fever over 102°F, diarrhea for more than two days that is not getting better, bloody diarrhea, vomiting so bad you cannot keep liquids down, or signs of dehydration. Children under 1, adults 65 and older, and people with weakened immune systems are at greater risk of severe illness. And if you got sick after eating raw oysters, ask to be tested; that stool sample is how cases get counted.

The County of San Luis Obispo Department of Public Health today updated its investigation into the outbreak of Shiga toxin-producing E. coli (STEC) suspected to be linked to an exposure at Brookshire Farms, the pumpkin patch and corn maze on Los Osos Valley Road in San Luis Obispo.

The investigation now includes five laboratory-confirmed E. coli O157 cases and eight more cases under investigation – people with symptoms consistent with STEC infection who visited the farm between October 16 and October 26. Three people have developed Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome (HUS). One additional person was hospitalized and released. That is up from the five confirmed cases the County announced earlier this week.

Brookshire Farms remains closed. The County says the farm has been cooperative and is working with Public Health, but the source of the infections on the farm is still under investigation.

“We encourage anyone who visited the farm during the exposure period and develops symptoms consistent with an E. coli infection to immediately contact their health care provider,” said Public Health Officer Dr. Christy Mulkerin.

Three HUS cases out of five confirmed is a terrible ratio, and the eight cases under investigation tell me this number is not done growing. We have been here before – pumpkin patches, corn mazes, petting zoos and fairs, where kids, animals, dirt and food all share the same space. This fall alone, Brookshire joins Bengtson’s Pumpkin Farm in Illinois on the list of agritourism E. coli outbreaks, and we are still dealing with last year’s Arizona State Fair petting zoo cases. Handwashing signs are not a food safety plan.

What to watch for

Symptoms of STEC infection include severe stomach cramps, diarrhea that is often bloody, vomiting and sometimes fever. Symptoms usually start 3 to 5 days after exposure but can take up to 10 days to appear. Children under 10 are at the highest risk of complications, including HUS.

Anyone who visited Brookshire Farms between October 16 and October 26 and develops these symptoms should contact a health care provider immediately and mention the farm visit. Bloody diarrhea or signs of dehydration call for prompt medical attention. Parents of a child recovering from diarrhea should watch for the warning signs of HUS – decreased urination, unusual paleness, fatigue and irritability – and get the child seen right away if they appear. According to the California Department of Public Health, STEC spreads through contaminated food or water, contact with animals and their environments, contaminated surfaces, and person to person when handwashing falls short.

With Halloween here, the County also recommends washing pumpkins and any surfaces they touch, avoiding further handling once a pumpkin is carved, and washing hands with soap and water after handling pumpkins.